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SEALING AND REVEALING: RETHINKING THE RULES




What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. But should the same slogan
apply to people who use the court system to gain information of public
importance and then agree among themselves to keep it secret? That was
the question faced by the New Jersey Supreme Court recently in Estate of
Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,' a case stemming from the deaths
of three Air Force officers whose van rolled over after the tread of one of
its Goodyear tires separated. 2 When the families of two of the deceased,
Captain Robert Frankl and Lieutenant Colonel Karen Budian, sued Good-
year in New Jersey state court, 3 both sides, as is common in products liabil-
ity actions,4 stipulated early in the case to an "umbrella" protective order,
pursuant to which the parties could designate materials exchanged in dis-
covery as "confidential" and thereby prevent them from being released to
the public. 5 The trial judge agreed to enforce the order.6
Three months into the discovery process, the families of Frank] and
Budian asked the court for permission to release publicly several of the
documents Goodyear had marked as confidential because, they alleged, the
documents revealed that the company had an "ongoing safety issue" with
the tire model at issue in the case and that at least eight other accidents had
* Law clerk to the Honorable Sidney H. Stein. A very special thanks to Judith Resnik, for
inspiring me and teaching me the importance of never ceasing to ask the hard questions, and to Julie
Rawe, for her brilliant editing and heroic patience.
1. 853 A.2d 880 (N.J. 2004).
2. Id. at 882; Robert Schwaneberg, The Dilemma of the Secret Settlements, SUNDAY STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 19, 2003, at 1.
3. Frankl, 853 A.2d at 882.
4. See Charles J. Reed, Confidentiality and the Courts: Secrecy's Threat to Public Safety, 76
JUDICATURE 308, 308 (1993) ("As a preemptive measure at the beginning of the discovery process,
defense attorneys insist that the plaintiff's attorney agree to a protective order preventing communica-
tion with anyone regarding any information provided by the manufacturer.").
5. Frankl, 853 A.2d at 882. The parties reserved the right to challenge any assertion of confiden-
tiality. Id.
6. See id.
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been caused by similar tread separations. 7 Consumers for Auto Reliability
and Safety ("CARS"), a consumer advocacy group, moved to intervene in
the case to have the protective order vacated or modified.8 CARS argued
that the public had a strong interest in seeing the documents because the
Goodyear tires at issue were in use on millions of vehicles throughout the
world.9
Shortly before the court was to rule on whether to release the docu-
ments, the parties reached a settlement agreement pursuant to which the
plaintiffs were paid $4.7 million in exchange for dropping the lawsuit and
agreeing to return and keep secret all documents that had been exchanged
in discovery. 10 CARS, however, continued to press for access, asserting
that Goodyear never demonstrated the "good cause" necessary for the court
to enter its initial protective order."l The New Jersey Supreme Court in
2004 unanimously rejected CARS's petition, reasoning that "[t]he universal
understanding in the legal community is that unfiled documents in discov-
ery are not subject to public access." 12
Although "universal understanding" smacks of an overstatement, the
Frankl court was correct that the majority of courts, both state and federal,
do not recognize a public right of access to materials that parties exchange
in discovery but do not file with the court. 13 Perhaps surprisingly, this posi-
tion has become even more pervasive in recent years 14 despite heightened
7. See Brief of Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety in Support of Motion to Intervene,
Vacate or Modify Protective Order, and Seek Public Access to Documents at 5, Estate of Frankl v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. MER-L-003052-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) [hereinafter
Brief of Consumers for Auto Reliability]. Newspaper articles reported an even more widespread prob-
lem, implicating the tire "in at least 44 crashes, 19 deaths, 160 injuries and 15,000 product liability
claims." See Collins Conner, Goodyear Kept Tire Problems Quiet, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 21,
2001, at IA.
8. Brief of Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Id.
10. See Schwaneberg, supra note 2.
11. See Michael Booth, Court Draws Line on Public Access to Discovery Data, N.J. LAW J., Aug.
2, 2004, at 1.
12. Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886, 887 (N.J. 2004).
13. See, e.g., SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that discovery
materials "do not carry a presumption of public access" (quoting United States v. Glens Falls Newpa-
pers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 857 (2d Cir. 1998)); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d
157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993) (no public access to materials attached to discovery motions); Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) ("We think it is clear and hold that there is no right of
public access to documents considered in discovery motions"). But see Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Generally, the public can gain access to litigation documents and
information produced during discovery unless the party opposing disclosure shows 'good cause' why a
protective order is necessary."). See also infra Part II.B.
14. One indication of the growing acceptance of the discovery-is-private view comes from the
Sedona Conference, a non-partisan law and policy think tank, which recently convened a "working
group" on the issue of court secrecy made up of several leading scholars and practitioners with exper-
tise in the topic. See SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING
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public awareness of, and outrage over, secrecy in litigation. News reports
describing how the Catholic archdioceses had secretly settled dozens of
lawsuits in cases involving priests who allegedly molested children1 5 and
how Firestone and Ford were able to hide the Ford Explorer's rollover
problems by settling scores of lawsuits with strict confidentiality clauses 16
have prompted more than a dozen states, 17 the U.S. Congress, 18 and several
federal courts 19 to consider new legislation or rules aimed at restricting
litigation secrecy. But thus far, the only new rules to be enacted since the
Firestone scandal first emerged in late 2000 address materials filed in court
(e.g., complaints, substantive motions, docket sheets, trial transcripts, and
judicial opinions) and do not deal with the broad discretion of courts to
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES iii (2005), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/wg2may05draft2 [hereinafter SEDONA
GUIDELINES] (revised April 2005 public comment draft). The working group's steering committee
includes Hon. Ronald J. Hedges, U.S. Magistrate Judge and Kenneth J. Withers, Federal Judicial Cen-
ter. Id. at 52-53. Its participants include Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General for New Jersey; Virginia B.
Evans, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Maryland; Laurie Kratky Dor6, Drake University Law
School; Scott Nelson, Public Citizen; James E. Rooks, Jr., Center for Constitutional Litigation; and
several prominent plaintiffs' and defense attorneys. Id. The Guidelines endorsed the position that
"[t]here is no presumed right of the public to participate in the discovery process or to have access to
the fruits of discovery that are not submitted to the court." Id. at 15. Some participants published "alter-
native viewpoints" that differed from several of the report's final conclusions, see SEDONA
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS,
CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES, ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS, available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/WG2AltViews.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006),
but the lack of a public right to participate in discovery received no such published dissent, see SEDONA
GUIDELINES, supra, at iv-vi.
15. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements
Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. In the case of a single
priest, Father John Geoghan, more than 130 people over twenty years brought accusations of sexual
abuse; the church confidentially settled at least fifty of these claims. See Michael Rezendes, Church
Allowed Abuse By Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al.
16. See Matthew L. Wald & Keith Bradsher, Judge Tells Firestone to Release Technical Data on
Tires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at C2 ("Officials at the Department of Transportation say the sealing
of documents in settled lawsuits is one reason they did not spot the pattern of scores of rollover deaths
in Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires that failed."). The recall of over fourteen million poten-
tially dangerous tires followed eight years of Ford and Firestone settling more than 100 lawsuits with
confidentiality agreements. The tires were linked to more than 270 deaths in the United States. See
Keith Bradsher, S. U. V. Tire Defects Were Known in "96 but Not Reported, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001,
at AI; Thomas W. Gerdel, On the Road Again: Tire Company Recovering After Disastrous Recall in
2000, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 4, 2004, at G1; Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bridgestone Agrees
to Pay $7.5 Million in Explorer Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at C1.
17. The states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. See Elizabeth E. Spainhour,
Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts to Expose Settlement Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards,
82 N.C. L. REV. 2155, 2157, 2161 (2004); Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, A.B.A. J.,
July 2002, at 20; Rebecca A. Womeldorf & William S. D. Cravens, More Sunshine Laws Proposed,
NAT'L L. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at B14.
18. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2003, S. 817, 108th Congress (2003).
19. See, e.g., D.S.C. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03; D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.3; S.D. Fla. LOCAL R. 5.4.
20061
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enter protective orders during discovery or the ability of parties to reach
private agreements to keep discovery confidential. 20
This Article asks whether courts, scholars, and policymakers should
reconsider the tenet that discovery is not subject to public access and, more
broadly, whether the currently predominant rules governing access to all
forms of information generated through litigation adequately protect the
interests of the public. At stake are several important-and sometimes
competing-public interests. On the one hand, public access to court re-
cords can make the judicial system more accountable, encourage better
performance of judicial duties, educate the public about the workings of the
civil justice system, and promote public confidence in the system by letting
citizens know they can see the information relied upon by judges to adjudi-
cate cases. 21 The public also can have an interest in seeing the information
uncovered by the process of litigation so that the activities of those who
discriminate or commit torts or break the law or back out of contracts are
brought to light.22 On the other hand, broad public access to documents
generated through litigation can jeopardize the privacy of individuals and
businesses and thereby make courts less desirable forums for the resolution
of disputes. 23 Rules governing access must balance these interests while
also ensuring that the justice system remains an efficient-and relatively
inexpensive-forum for dispute resolution.
I argue that the current rules give too much weight to the interests of
privacy and expediency at the expense of promoting judicial accountability,
democratic engagement, and public confidence in the judicial system. The
resolution of the Frankl case, for example, illustrates how a blanket holding
that discovery is private prevents courts from even considering the public
interest in determining whether certain materials generated through litiga-
20. See D.S.C. LOCAL. Civ. R. 5.03 (restricting ability of courts to seal filed settlement agree-
ments, while allowing bilateral secrecy covenants between litigants); D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(b), (c)
(requiring notice and hearing before sealing documents filed in court, but also sanctioning the ability of
parties to "enter into written agreements to keep materials produced in discovery confidential and to
return or destroy such materials as agreed by parties and as allowed by law"); Model Order Regarding
Confidentiality, Judge Mark R. Kravitz (D. Conn. 2005) (requiring a showing of "extraordinary circum-
stances" for a court document to be sealed from public view; the rule does not apply to unfiled discov-
ery).
21. See, e.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he bright
light cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice,
incompetence, perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process should provide the
public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fair-
ness." (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995))); see also infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at I (noting that civil litigation can entail "disclosure
of intimate personal or financial information" and that "[tirade secrets or confidential marketing, re-
search, or commercial information may be at stake").
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tion can be made public. At issue in Frankl were thirty-one documents that
allegedly contained information about the safety of the Goodyear tires-
information that was at the center of the merits of the litigation and, if the
allegations in the complaint were accurate, could potentially have saved
dozens of lives if made public. 24 The documents, while not filed with the
court, were generated through a process of judicial coercion-that is,
Goodyear would not have turned them over absent the law requiring dis-
covery-and their confidentiality was protected by a judicial order. But the
lack of any public right of access to unfiled discovery made the court pow-
erless to balance the competing public interests. As a result, the parties,
rather than the court, had control over what the public was able to learn
about the case. The parties were able to use secrecy as a bargaining chip
during settlement negotiations, resulting in the plaintiffs being paid what
was presumably a premium for agreeing to remain silent about the poten-
tially explosive information they had learned in discovery. The ability to
engage in this kind of secret dealmaking is, at least in part, what enabled
the Catholic archdioceses and Ford/Firestone to keep their wrongdoing
quiet for so many years despite being sued again and again in courtrooms
throughout the country. 25
This is not to say that the public should have an automatic right to
view all or most of the material exchanged in discovery. Rather, rules must
be crafted to give courts the ability-and incentive-to sufficiently weigh
the importance of public access against litigants' interests in privacy and
the system's interest in efficiency. The problem with many of the currently
predominant rules governing access to court documents, and especially
those that say the public has no right to access unfiled discovery, is that
judges are powerless, or provided with little motivation, to consider the
interests of the public. The result is that there is no balancing and private
parties, rather than publicly-financed courts, control what information the
public sees.
This Article is divided into two sections. The first looks at the rules
governing what I refer to as "judicial" information: information generated
through litigation that is directly tied to judicial decision-making, including
pleadings, motions, judicial opinions, court orders, and settlement agree-
ments that are approved of or enforced by the court. The second examines
the rules governing what I refer to as "litigant-centered" information. These
materials, which are generated as a result of court processes but do not
form the basis for judicial decision-making, consist of discovery that has
24. See Booth, supra note 11.
25. See Robinson, supra note 15; Wald & Bradsher, supra note 16.
2006]
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been exchanged between the parties but that has yet to be used in court, as
well as privately reached, privately enforced settlement agreements. The
crucial difference between the two categories is that the primary public
interest implicated in the accessibility of judicial information is in enabling
the public to monitor the exercise of judicial power, whereas the public
interest in litigant-centered information is typically in the raw material
itself, and not as it relates to the workings of the court.
26
Each of this Article's two sections begins by analyzing the competing
public interests at stake. Why is it important to provide the public with
access to information generated through litigation? What kinds of privacy
are put at risk by granting such access? The sections go on to examine the
rules most courts currently apply when determining whether judicial or
litigant-centered information should be made available to the public and
explore whether these rules adequately weigh the competing public inter-
ests.
Each section then looks at possible alternative regimes. In the last fif-
teen years, a handful of states and courts have experimented with different
forms of "sunshine" rules that attempt to prohibit certain kinds of litigation
secrecy. 27 Some of the rules, such as the District of South Carolina's re-
cently enacted ban on filing sealed settlements with the court, 28 apply ex-
26. I use the terms "judicial" and "litigant-centered" information as opposed to "filed" and "un-
filed" because the essential questions are how the materials are used and what public interests they
implicate, not whether a court permitted or required their filing. Compare SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273
F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to
render that paper a judicial document subject to the right of access." (quoting United States v. Amodeo,
44 F.3d 141, 145)), with Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 783 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[W]hether the relevant document is in the court file is the critical inquiry."). As detailed in Part II,
infra, Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was revised in 2000 to prohibit the filing of
discovery materials until they are "used in the proceeding." FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d). See also FED. R. CIv.
P. 5, Committee Notes on Rules-2000 Amendment. The stated intent of the revision was to ease the
burden on clerks' offices, not to alter access rights to discovery materials. See infra Part II. Thus,
inquiring into whether materials are located in a court's file, while relevant to matters of custody and
document preservation, sheds no light on whether the materials should be publicly accessible as a
policy matter.
27. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerns about too much secrecy in litigation, spurred on by
news reports of hundreds of lawsuits being sealed from public view, see, e.g., Elsa Walsh & Benjamin
Weiser, Court Secrecy Masks Safety Issues: Key GM Fuel Tank Memos Kept Hidden in Auto Crash
Suits, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1988, at Al, prompted more than twenty-five states to consider legislation
prohibiting various forms of court secrecy. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders,
and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427, 429 n.7 (1991) (listing the proposed bills).
While the vast majority of these initiatives failed, anti-secrecy provisions were enacted in Florida,
Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. See id.; infra Parts 1.D and I1.C. More recently, New
Jersey passed a law in 2003 requiring certain information about medical malpractice settlements to be
made public, see infra Part II.C.4, and the federal district courts in South Carolina and New Jersey
enacted local rules restricting judges' abilities to order certain documents to be kept under seal, see
infra Part I.D.
28. D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.03.
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clusively to judicial information; others, such as Texas's Rule 76a,29 at-
tempt to address both judicial and litigant-centered secrecy. The Article
analyzes what proponents say were the motivations behind these sunshine
experiments and looks in detail at how these rules have worked in practice.
I conclude that while the sunshine rules have not achieved all of their in-
tended objectives, they provide a roadmap for a system of civil litigation in
which concerns about privacy and efficiency are considered but are not
permitted to subsume the public's interest in being able to access court-
generated information.
I. THE RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL INFORMATION
A. The Public Interest in Judicial Information
Courts are public institutions that exercise enormous power over peo-
ple's lives. This power is coupled with a measure of accountability, how-
ever, by granting the public access to "judicial" information, the documents
that judges rely upon to make decisions and create as part of their exercise
of judicial duties.30 The public's interest in monitoring the actions of the
courts was recognized in the earliest days of the American republic, when
the "common right" to obtain and inspect a copy of a court record was
viewed as sacrosanct. 31
Broad public access to judicial information advances several impor-
tant societal goals: it promotes public confidence in the judicial system, 32
enhances the quality of justice by enabling the public to monitor judicial
behavior, 33 educates the public about the workings of the courts, 34 and
29. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
30. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1 ("Public access to judicial proceedings facili-
tates public monitoring of our publicly-created, staffed, and subsidized judicial system. Fair and open
judicial proceedings and decisions encourage public confidence in and respect for the courts-a trust
essential to continued support of the judiciary. A public eye on the litigation process can enhance fair
and accurate fact-finding and decision-making.... A public trial also educates citizens about the justice
system itself as well as its workings in a particular case.").
31. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 471 (rev. ed., Philadel-
phia, Rees Welsh & Co. 1899) (noting that any limitation on the right to inspect court records would be
"repugnant to the genius of American institutions"); see also Nixon v. Warner Comm'cs, Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 612-13 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to inspect and copy public records
predates the Constitution); Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504, 506 (D. Colo. 1902)
("[T]he matter of inspecting and taking copies of public records is as old in the law as the records are
old.").
32. Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988).
33. See Anne Elizabeth Cohen, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1813, 1827 (1984) ("The availability of documents means that graft and ignorance will
be more difficult to conceal.").
34. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 1.
2006]
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informs citizens of "opportunities for participation in the system that would
otherwise pass unknown to many members of the public. '35 As Justice
Holmes explained:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public
eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of pub-
lic concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who ad-
minister justice should always act under the sense of public
responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed. 36
The public's interest in monitoring what courts do ostensibly peaks
during civil and criminal trials, where judges make myriad decisions, large
and small, that impact the cases before them. 37 The interest is no less com-
pelling, however, with regard to pre- and post-trial materials that judges
rely upon to make decisions, especially considering that the vast majority
of civil litigation concludes prior to trial.38 In a case that ends in a grant of
summary judgment, for example, a citizen cannot monitor whether the
judge based his decision on proper considerations without having access to
the materials the judge relied upon.39 Similarly, if a court approves of or
agrees to enforce a settlement contract, the public has a strong interest in
knowing the terms of the settlement in order to evaluate the court's invoca-
tion of its power over the settlement.40
While the public's ability to monitor the exercise of judicial power is
the central interest at stake with regard to the accessibility of judicial in-
formation, it is not the public's only interest. The public also has an interest
in seeing the content of materials generated through litigation when that
35. Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
36. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
37. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that the
public's ability to access civil trials is "inherent in the nature of our democratic form of government").
38. In 2001 and 2002 combined, more than 500,000 federal civil cases terminated, yet there were
fewer than 13,000 trials. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 123
tbl.C (2002) (showing 248,174 civil cases terminated in 2001 and 259,537 civil cases terminated in
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrptO2/2002,pdf, id. at 162, tbl.C-7 (showing
6,015 civil trials completed during twelve-month period ending September 30, 2002); LEONIDAS RALPH
MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 163, tbl.C-7 (2001) (showing 6,513 civil trials
completed during the twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt0l/2001.pdf.
39. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[D]ocuments used by parties moving for,
or opposing, summary judgment should not remain under seal absent the most compelling reasons.").
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11 th Cir. 1992) ("It is imma-
terial whether the sealing of the record is an integral part of a negotiated settlement between the parties,
even if the settlement comes with the court's active encouragement. Once a matter is brought before a
court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties' case, but also the public's case.").
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content implicates the merits of the cases brought.41 In a recent lawsuit
alleging gender discrimination at Deutsche Bank AG, for example, a court
ordered the release of four pages of an internal study of diversity at the
bank that revealed that, in contrast to its competitors, the company had "no
women in top management positions. ' 42 The public's interest in the study
stemmed in part from the judge's reliance on the study in denying the com-
pany's motion for summary judgment. But the public also had an interest in
seeing documentary evidence of potential gender discrimination at one of
the world's foremost investment banks.43 Had the court not sua sponte
ordered the study's release, the public would never have seen it because the
parties settled on the eve of trial and agreed to keep the study, along with
other documents central to the merits of the case, confidential.
44
Broad public access to judicial information serves another important
purpose: the formation and shaping of societal norms. Professor Judith
Resnik argues persuasively that transparent court processes establish stan-
dards for non-judicial forms of adjudication as well as for courts in other
countries, and have led to widespread societal condemnation of sexual
harassment and domestic violence. 45
Running counter to these concerns, however, is the public's interest in
protecting the privacy of individuals and the proprietary information of
businesses. The process of civil litigation can require litigants to reveal to
courts information that the public has an interest in keeping confidential,
such as materials related to national security, the names of rape victims, or
valuable trade secrets. The public would be harmed by a system of litiga-
tion that required, for example, the Coca-Cola Company to publicly reveal
its recipe for Coca-Cola Zero just because a judge viewed the recipe in
evaluating a competitor's lawsuit for trade secret misappropriation. Such a
system would no doubt invite frivolous lawsuits from competitors and per-
haps stifle companies from investing in innovation.
In cases that implicate legitimate privacy interests (i.e., not simply a
company's or person's desire to avoid public scrutiny of wrongdoing),
courts, when determining whether to grant public access to judicial infor-
41. For a more detailed discussion of the public's interest in the content of what transpires in
litigation, see infra Part II.A.
42. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02 Civ. 4791, 2003 WL 21511851, at *2, *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003), ajf'd in part, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
43. See Gambale, 377 F.3d at 136 (noting that the district court judge "wondered aloud why the
public should not know about discrimination at a major banking institution").
44. SeeGambale,2003WL21511851,at*1.
45. Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-
Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 521 (2006); Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 405,405-26 (1987).
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mation, need to balance requests for confidentiality against the public's
interests in monitoring judicial action and viewing evidence of potential
wrongdoing. The question central to this Article is whether the currently
predominant rules and procedures governing access to judicial information
give courts the ability and incentive to undertake this kind of balancing.
B. The Rules Governing Access Rights to Judicial Information
Both state and federal courts recognize a First Amendment or com-
mon law right of public access to most forms of judicial information. 46 The
Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,47 recognized a
"right to attend criminal trials" as being "implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment," but has not addressed whether the First Amendment
applies to access to civil trials. 48 Lower courts, however, have found that
the rationale of Richmond Newspapers-that open trials assure "freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government"
49-
extends to the forms of judicial information that most concern "the free
discussion of governmental affairs." 50 Accordingly, courts of appeals have
recognized First Amendment rights to attend civil trials and access civil
trial transcripts, 51 to view documents accompanying motions for summary
judgment,52 and to access civil docket sheets, 53 but have held that the First
Amendment does not apply to the public's ability to access discovery mate-
rials used at trial. 54
Because First Amendment access rights are limited to matters invok-
ing "freedom of communication," 55 in most situations courts turn to the
common law when determining whether to grant public access to judicial
information. The common law right of access applies to all "judicial deci-
46. See, e.g., Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 16 (Ill. 2000) (recognizing a "common
law right of access to [civil] court records" as "essential to the proper functioning of a democracy");
Gambale, 377 F.3d at 140 ("The public has a common law presumptive right of access to judicial
documents, and likely a constitutional one as well." (citation omitted)).
47. 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
48. See id. at 580, 580 n.17 ("Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open.").
49. Id. at 575.
50. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 735 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. See id. at 1069-70.
52. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988).
53. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2004).
54. See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
55. See id. at 1331-32.
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sions and the documents which comprise the bases of those decisions. ' 56
Courts largely agree that the right extends not only to trial documents such
as exhibits, but also to materials related to most pretrial court rulings, 57 as
well as to settlement agreements filed with the court.58 Courts also have
repeatedly held that neither the First Amendment nor the common law right
of public access to judicial information is absolute; rather, both rights cre-
ate a presumption that parties wishing to seal must overcome. 59
Courts differ widely, however, in terms of the rules and procedures
employed to ensure this presumption of access is protected. In the majority
of states and districts, the rules governing sealing of judicial information
come from judicial doctrine as opposed to rules of procedure. 60 While the
doctrine and rules vary, the standards and procedures they mandate can be
grouped roughly into three tiers: 1) rules that require a compelling interest
56. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994).
57. See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993)
(common law right of access applies to materials accompanying all "pretrial motions of a non-discovery
nature"); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660 (3d Cir. 1991)
(common law right of access applies to summary judgment motion and attached documents).
58. See, e.g., Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Now that the
[settlement] agreement itself has become a subject of litigation, it must be opened to the public just like
other information... that becomes the subject of litigation."); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d
845, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The presumption in favor of the public's common law right of access to
court records.., applies to settlement agreements that are filed and submitted to the district
court .... ); EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 169-70 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying presumption of
right of access to consent decree filed with settlement agreement); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Once a settlement is filed in
the district court, it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the access accorded such records.").
Courts disagree, however, about whether the common law right applies to discovery materials
that are filed with the court in connection with discovery motions. The Third Circuit, in ruling that a
right of access does not apply to such materials, reasoned that holding otherwise "would make raw
discovery, ordinarily inaccessible to the public, accessible merely because it had to be included in
motions precipitated by inadequate discovery responses or overly aggressive discovery demands."
Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 164. See also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) ("There
is no tradition of public access to discovery, and requiring a trial court to scrutinize carefully public
claims of access would be incongruous with the goals of the discovery process."). The D.C. Circuit, on
the other hand, has held that the common law right applies to materials attached to discovery motions
because of the centrality of the role discovery plays in civil litigation. See Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d
1100, 1112 (D.C. 1988). The court explained:
The manner in which [discovery] proceeds may prove decisive to the outcome of particular
disputes, and the availability of mandatory discovery has greatly affected the way in which
our courts do justice. Moreover, discovery procedures have become a continuing focus of
controversy and reform within the judiciary and the legal community. This debate has arisen
precisely because discovery is so important in trial practice.
Id.
59. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that the strong pre-
sumption of public access to judicial information "may be rebutted").
60. As of 2003, eleven federal districts (out of ninety-four) and twenty-two states had drafted
procedural rules that limit a judge's discretion to seal court documents. See TIM REAGAN ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SErLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT-MAY 2003




and narrow tailoring in order to seal; 2) rules that require weighing the
public interest in access against countervailing interests in privacy; and
3) rules that require a showing of "good cause" in order to seal.
The first tier mainly involves cases implicating First Amendment ac-
cess rights.61 In such cases, courts generally require parties requesting se-
crecy to show that the denial of access "serves an important governmental
interest and that there is no less restrictive Way to serve that governmental
interest. '62 The Fourth Circuit takes the extra step of adding to this required
showing a series of procedural protections. In Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, a libel case in which the entire record accompanying a summary
judgment motion was placed under seal, the Fourth Circuit held that be-
cause the First Amendment protected access to the materials at issue, the
trial court had to provide the public with "adequate notice" of the request to
seal and an opportunity to challenge the request before the court made its
decision.63 Moreover, if the court decided to seal, it had to state its reasons
on the record, supported by specific findings, as well as its reasons for re-
jecting alternatives to sealing.64 The rationale for the procedure came from
Justice Powell, who wrote in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,65 a case involv-
ing the closing of criminal proceedings, that "[i]t is not enough.., that trial
courts apply a certain standard to requests for closure. If the constitutional
right of the press and public to access is to have substance, representatives
of these groups must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of
their exclusion."'66 The Fourth Circuit's procedural protections are less than
they appear, however, in that the notice provision applies only to those
members of the public already in the courtroom.
6 7
61. Two jurisdictions-the state of Texas and the Northern District of California-apply a form of
the compelling interest/least-restrictive means standard to more than just First Amendment materials.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 76(a) (discussed in Part I.D, infra); N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 79-5(b) (2003) (commen-
tary) (stating that all requests to seal must be "narrowly tailored to seal only the particular information
that is genuinely privileged or protectable as a trade secret or otherwise has a compelling need for
confidentiality").
62. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Rushford v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
63. Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253-54.
64. Id. at 254.
65. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
66. Id. at 400-01 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. See In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e believe individual
notice is unwarranted. Notifying the persons present in the courtroom of the request to seal or docketing
it reasonably in advance of deciding the issue is appropriate."). Some courts within the Fourth Circuit
have been reversed for failing to grant even this limited form of notice. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Mont-
gomery County Pub. Sch., 25 F.App'x 123, 132-33 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court that had not
provided "public notice or an opportunity for interested parties to object").
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The second and third tiers involve common law right-of-access cases.
Courts that employ the second tier of protection require that to win a seal-
ing order, the public's interest in access must be outweighed or "heavily
outweighed" by countervailing interests in privacy. 68 Pursuant to this stan-
dard, the public's interest in viewing the materials must be considered, but
the denial of access, unlike in First Amendment cases, does not need to be
narrowly tailored to the countervailing interest asserted. One federal district
and several states have adopted procedural rules requiring this balancing
test to be applied to all motions to seal court records.
69
The third level of protection requires only a showing of "good cause"
to win a sealing order. The good cause standard, which gives trial judges
broad discretion to determine the propriety of a sealing request,70 has been
adopted into procedural rules by nine federal districts
71 and five states.72
Judges, however, have varied widely in their interpretations of what consti-
tutes sufficient good cause in order to seal court records, with some explic-
itly requiring a weighing of public interests73 and others finding a showing
of good cause even though only the interests of private parties were ad-
vanced. 74 The Sixth Circuit has held that the good cause requirement of
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs all requests to
seal, 75 even though by its terms the rule applies only to the issuance of
68. E.g., Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (stating that the common law presumption of access "can be
rebutted if countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access"); In re Cendant
Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.
2002) (the "'strong presumption in favor of access' to judicial documents... 'can be overcome' only
by showing 'sufficiently important countervailing interests') (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v.
U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)).
69. See W.D. WASH. LOCAL CIv. R. 5(g)(1) (requiring that in order to seal court records, the
"strong presumption of public access" must be outweighed by "the interests of the public and the parties
in protecting files.., from public review"); FJC 2003 REPORT, supra note 60, at 5 (describing proce-
dural rules in California, Idaho, Indiana, and North Carolina that require privacy interests to outweigh
public interests in order for court records to be sealed; and rules in Georgia and Utah that require pri-
vacy interests to "clearly" outweigh public interests).
70. See, e.g., Does I Through III v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc.,
924 P.2d 273, 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (good cause finding can only be reversed on abuse of discre-
tion).
71. The districts are Northern California, Northern Illinois, Western Michigan, Northern and
Southern Mississippi, Eastern Missouri, Northern Oklahoma, Eastern Tennessee and Utah. See FJC
2003 REPORT, supra note 60, at 2 n.2.
72. The states are Delaware, Michigan, New York, Tennessee, and Vermont. See id. at 5.
73. E.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 786 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (good cause to seal
court records requires compelling circumstances and a weighing of public interests).
74. E.g., Bd. of Comm'rs of Dofia Ana County v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 76 P.3d 36, 40 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2003) (good cause requires a showing of a "clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking
closure" (quoting Krahling v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 562, 567 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998))).
75. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Rule 26(c)
allows the sealing of court papers only for 'good cause shown."').
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protective orders during discovery. 76 While Rule 26(c) does not define
good cause,77 it suggests that the need to protect a party from "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" is sufficient with-
out any required balancing of countervailing public access interests. 78 The
Sixth Circuit has stressed, however, that good cause does not permit the
parties to "adjudicate their own case based on their own self-interest. '79
C. Do the Currently Predominant Rules Adequately Balance Interests in
Access?
The public's interests in accessing judicial information are often inde-
pendent of the desires or rights of the parties in any given case. In many, or
perhaps most, cases, both parties may prefer secrecy, but that alone cannot
trump the societal utility of providing public access. Recognizing this,
courts that adhere to the first two tiers of rules require an explicit weighing
of the public's interest against any countervailing interest in secrecy. The
third tier's "good cause" requirement, by contrast, gives judges broad dis-
cretion to seal information without mandating such a balancing test, poten-
tially enabling a party's interest in secrecy to prevail without a sufficient
consideration of the public's interest in access. Even more problematic is
that in all three tiers, other than the Fourth Circuit's limited notice provi-
sion in First Amendment cases, courts generally do not give members of
the public or other interested parties a sufficient opportunity to intervene to
challenge requests to seal.
The result is that in most cases involving secrecy requests, the only
representative of the public's interest is the trial judge, whose own interests
may conflict with the public's. Trial judges-at least according to several
commentators, including ones who sit behind the bench-"are under great
pressure to clear their calendars" and "tend, therefore, to approve secrecy
agreements that encourage settlement. '80 In addition to being motivated by
expediency, political pressures and the desire to cultivate relationships with
other lawyers may play a role in state court, where many judges are elected,
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 227.
80. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 517
(1994). See also Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 729 (2004) ("[J]udges face incredible
pressure to go along with court-ordered secrecy in the heat of battle.").
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resulting in judges granting secrecy orders regardless of the public interest
in disclosure. 81
The extent to which judges sign off on secrecy without fully consider-
ing the public interest is difficult to gauge because secrecy requests may
not be docketed, and even when they are, "the public record almost never
include[s] specific findings justifying sealing. '82 Some evidence suggests,
however, that the existing rules governing judicial information do not ade-
quately protect public interests in access. In Connecticut, for example, in-
vestigations by the Hartford Courant and the Connecticut Law Tribune in
late 2002 revealed that Connecticut courts had sealed the files of about
7,000 cases and had designated another forty or more cases as so "super-
secret" that court clerks were instructed to deny their existence. 83 The re-
porters had assumed that many of the sealed cases would be family court
cases, which can implicate unique privacy interests, but the investigation
revealed that a large number of non-family civil cases had also been sealed,
including ones whose captions indicated potential public interest implica-
tions, such as Connecticut Department of Health v. Silver Hill Hospital and
Connecticut Attorney General v. Kimber Manufacturing.84 Significantly,
this court-ordered secrecy-much of which was unaccompanied by public
explanations for judicial sealing decisions 85-occurred despite rules in the
Connecticut Practice Book stating that proceedings and pleadings can only
be sealed when a party's interest in privacy outweighs the presumed right
of the public to open trials, and that judges have to issue public decisions
about why sealing some or all of a proceeding is warranted.
86
Connecticut may be an extreme example, but the most extensive study
available of court-ordered secrecy, completed in 2004 by the Federal Judi-
cial Center ("FJC"), the research arm of the federal judiciary, suggests that
sealing without explanation occurs in significant numbers of cases in fed-
eral courts as well. 87 The FJC examined 288,846 cases that had been dis-
81. See Steve McGonigle, Secret Lawsuits Shelter Wealthy, Influential, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 22, 1987, at IA. The article quotes Bill Long, who as district clerk of Dallas County was the
custodian of the sealed records: "From my understanding, a lot of those records were sealed for other
than judicial reasons, probably political considerations, maybe favoritism with certain law firms." Id.
82. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 7 (2004) [hereinafter FJC 2004 REPORT].
83. See CONN. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE COURTS
12-13 (2004) (hereinafter CBA REPORT]; see also Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d 83, 86-87 (detailing
how Connecticut courts had been routinely sealing scores of entire case files and docket sheets without
providing any justification).
84. See CBA REPORT, supra note 83, at 13.
85. See id. at 12-13.
86. See id. at 12.
87. See FJC 2004 REPORT, supra note 82.
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posed of by federal courts in 2001 and 2002, and found that 1,270, or
0.44%, of the cases studied were resolved with settlement agreements
sealed by the court. 88 The report concluded that such sealing was not a
significant problem because it was "rare" and because "[i]n 97% of the
cases [with sealed settlements], the complaint is not sealed, so the public
has access to information about the alleged wrongdoers and wrongdo-
ings."89
But the FJC's numbers can be read in a different way. The report
categorized 503 of the cases with judicially-sealed settlements, or forty
percent, as ones "that might be of special public interest," including 258
products liability cases. 90 These are significant numbers by themselves, but
they are even more significant considering that the FJC defined "special
public interest" narrowly, limiting the category to cases involving envi-
ronmental harm, products liability, sexual abuse, and those with a public
party as defendant. 91 Left out of the forty percent were 88 Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act cases, 223 "Other Employment/Labor" cases, and 124 "Other
Civil Rights" cases.92 The public arguably has a "special" interest in know-
ing how all of these cases were resolved because the cases involve accusa-
tions that private actors had violated federal statutes intended to protect
workers and minorities. Without access, the public is unable to evaluate or
monitor judges' decisions to approve these settlements and agree to enforce
their terms.
It is possible, therefore, that collectively more than 900 of the 1,270
cases with sealed settlements involved strong countervailing public inter-
ests in access, and because the judges in almost all of these cases did not
justify their decisions to seal, 93 we have no way of knowing whether the
public's interests were given proper consideration. As Judge Joseph Ander-
son, who led the District of South Carolina's effort to ban sealed settle-
88. See id. at 3.
89. Id. at 8. The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules relied on these find-
ings in rejecting a 2004 proposal that would have limited judicial discretion to seal court records. See
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Honorable Herbert
Kohl, U.S. Senate, Nov. 17, 2004 [hereinafter Nov. 17 Mecham Letter] (on file with author) ("Based on
the relatively small number of cases involving a sealed settlement agreement, the availability of other
sources, including the complaint, to inform the public of potential hazards in cases involving a sealed
settlement agreement, and the questionable authority and ability of the [Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules] to regulate confidentiality provisions enforced by state substantive law, the Committee con-
cluded that no amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate.").
90. FJC 2004 REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 tbl.2.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5.




ments, notes, "even if confidential settlements are occurring in only a small
number of cases, the regrettable fact is that those cases are often the very
cases not deserving of court-ordered secrecy."'94
Furthermore, the assertion that the public can learn what it needs to
know from the unsealed complaints misconstrues how information about
litigation is disseminated. Neither ordinary citizens nor journalists are ca-
pable of poring through the hundreds of thousands of complaints filed
every year, and because complaints are only allegations, they often become
newsworthy only upon word of a settlement. A court's sealing of the set-
tlement, therefore, can effectively "secretize" 95 the entire case, regardless
of whether the complaint is accessible. Moreover, the public's interest in
viewing a settlement approved of or enforced by a court is not only in
learning about "alleged wrongdoers and wrongdoings" but also in being
able to monitor the court's exercise of its power over the settlement.
The limited evidence available, therefore, while far from conclusive,
suggests that the currently predominant rules have allowed a significant
amount of judicial information to be sealed without sufficient weighing of
the public's interests in access.
D. Alternative Regimes
1. The Prohibition Response: "Banning" Sealed Settlements
In November 2002, the federal district judges in South Carolina voted
8-2 to enact what is now Local Rule 5.03(E), which reads, "No settlement
agreement filed with the court shall be sealed pursuant to the terms of this
Rule."'96 The impetus for this blanket rule was the sentiment that the doc-
trinal standards governing the sealing of filed settlement agreements were
not affording adequate protection to the public's interest in openness. 97
Fourth Circuit case law requires that in order to overcome the public's
common law right of access to filed settlement agreements, countervailing
interests must "heavily outweigh" the public's interest in access. 98 Accord-
ing to Judge Anderson, however, this requirement was "sometimes more
honored in the breach than in the observance" due to the "incredible
amount of pressure brought to bear on a judge when a favorable settlement
94. Anderson, supra note 80, at 738.
95. The term is Richard Zitrin's. See Richard Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the
Parties, or a Broader Public Interest?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1565, 1566 (2004).
96. D.S.C. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03(E); Anderson, supra note 80, at 725.
97. See Anderson, supra note 80, at 718-19.
98. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
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is reached contingent on a secrecy agreement." 99 If a judge rejects the deal,
the plaintiff may lose the settlement and the case may go to trial-a risk
many judges are unwilling to take in the name of promoting openness in
the court system. 100 The purpose of the local rule, therefore, was to take
"court-ordered secrecy off the table as a bargaining chip."lOl
One of the most common criticisms of the rule when it was enacted
was that it would deter parties from settling and thus flood the courts with
more trials than they could handle. 102 Without acknowledging whether
docket pressure is an appropriate defense of the status quo, Judge Anderson
responded that litigants seeking secrecy would be unlikely to give up a
settlement in exchange for "the most public of all institutions-a trial be-
fore a jury in an open courtroom.
'103
Importantly, the South Carolina rule expressly does not impact the
ability of parties to settle privately;104 rather, it applies only on those rare
occasions in which parties ask the court for judicial approval of their set-
tlements (i.e., the types of settlements that were the subject of the 2004 FJC
Report).105 The narrow scope of the rule thus makes it unlikely to have any
impact at all on the court's caseload. In fact, in the twelve months follow-
ing the enactment of the rule, judges in the district tried two fewer cases
than they did in the twelve months prior to its enactment.10 6
A more nuanced criticism comes from Judge Lee Rosenthal, chair of
the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Judge
Rosenthal is concerned that banning sealed settlements from being filed
with the court may encourage litigants who would otherwise be inclined to
seek court approval instead to settle privately, thereby depriving the public
of any representative in the process at all. 107 One problem with this argu-
ment is that a large proportion of sealed settlement agreements filed with
courts are in cases in which court approval of any settlement is required,
99. Anderson, supra note 80, at 718, 721 n.3 1.
100. Id. at 721 n.31.
101. Id. at 730.
102. See id. at 726.
103. Id.
104. See D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.03 ("Nothing in this Rule limits the ability of the parties, by
agreement, to restrict access to documents which are not filed with the Court."). In some cases, such as
those involving minors and class actions, judicial approval of any settlement agreement is required.
105. See Nov. 17 Mecham Letter, supra note 89 ("[M]ost settlement agreements are neither filed
with a court nor require court approval. Instead, most settlement agreements are private contractual
obligations.").
106. Anderson, supra note 80, at 726.
107. Interview with Judge Lee Rosenthal, New Haven, Connecticut, Dec. 10, 2004. Cf D.N.J.
LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(d) (prohibiting parties from submitting proposed settlements to the court unless
required to do so by law).
[Vol 81:375
SEALING AND REVEALING
such as those involving minors, class actions, and alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 108 Litigants in these cases have nowhere else to
go, and the fact that court involvement is required by statute suggests that
the public has a strong interest in their outcomes or in monitoring the proc-
ess of judicial decision-making. Secondly, for those cases in which litigants
have the option of settling privately, there is a value in having the court
insist on openness as the price for judicial enforcement of the agreement. A
privately reached settlement can be enforced only through state contract
law, whereas a court-approved settlement is backed by a much bigger club:
the court's power of contempt. The aim of the South Carolina rule is to
protect the public's interest in monitoring how courts wield this power.
A third criticism of the rule is that its categorical language ("No set-
tlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed."'109) does not pro-
vide courts with sufficient flexibility to weigh countervailing interests such
as the protection of trade secrets or the names of minors. 110 Judge Ander-
son has emphasized, however, that in situations in which "a legitimate need
for court-ordered secrecy can be demonstrated," an "escape valve" exists,
in that the local rules also state that upon "good cause shown," a court may
suspend or modify any local rule.111 Read together, the South Carolina
rules "establish a preference for openness at settlement, while still preserv-
ing the ability of the presiding judge to seal a settlement when, for exam-
ple, proprietary information or trade secrets need to be protected, or a
particularly vulnerable party needs to be shielded from the glare of an oth-
erwise newsworthy settlement."' 112 The problem with this escape valve is
that the exception has the potential to swallow the rule. Is the filing of a
sealed settlement truly "off the table" if a party can make a showing of
good cause to have the rule suspended?
Overall, then, while it is too early to determine the kind of impact
South Carolina's local rule will have, it appears to take at least a small step
toward combating the problem of judges being pressured into signing off
on secrecy without properly weighing the public's interests in access. The
rule gives judges a tool with which to say "No" to requests for secrecy.
That said, the rule's escape valve puts secrecy back on the table any time
108. See FJC 2004 REPORT, supra note 82, at 3.
109. D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(E) (emphasis added).
110. See Laurie Kratky Dor&, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's New
Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REv. 791, 823 (2004) (arguing that by rendering
the ordinarily qualified presumption of access irrebuttable, the South Carolina rule "goes too far; the
rationale for public access to judicial records 'supports a strong presumption rather than an absolute
rule"') (quoting Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Il1. Anderson, supra note 80, at 722-23. See also D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 1.02.
112. Anderson, supra note 80, at 723 (emphasis omitted).
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litigants claim they can make a showing of good cause. Furthermore, be-
cause the rule applies only to sealed settlements and not to other forms of
court-enforced secrecy, and because it expressly endorses the ability of
parties to reach private secret settlements, it may end up having little effect
on the amount of court-generated information the public is able to see.
2. The Procedural Response: Giving Public Representatives a Chance to
Intervene
Whereas South Carolina's Local Rule 5.03(E) attempts to ensure pub-
lic access to certain forms of judicial information by taking the option of
secrecy off the bargaining table, the state of Texas and the federal districts
of Maryland and New Jersey have chosen a different method: giving public
representatives a meaningful ability to challenge any request to seal. 1 3 All
three jurisdictions require that: 1) requests to seal are posted on the courts'
public dockets; 114 2) interested or third parties have an opportunity to in-
tervene or object to any motion to seal; 115 and 3) courts, before granting
any request to seal, make specific findings that alternatives to sealing do
not provide sufficient protection. 1 6 Because Texas's Rule 76a is the most
comprehensive and has been in effect for the longest period of time, I ex-
plore its history, function, and effectiveness in some depth.
The initial impetus behind Rule 76a was a series of articles published
in 1987 by the Dallas Morning News detailing the increasingly "routine"
sealing of court files by judges in Dallas County.' 1 7 Many of the sealed
files came from cases that appeared to have significant interest to the pub-
113. See D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(c); D. MD. Civ. R. 105.11; TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3).
114. See D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.3(c)(2) (requiring secrecy requests to be made available to the
public); D. MD. Civ. R. 105.11 (requiring same to be docketed and made available to the public); TEX.
R. CIv. P. 76a(3) (requiring notice to be posted with the Texas Supreme Court).
115. See D.N.J. LOCAL CIv. R. 5.3(c)(4) (allowing "[a]ny intersted person" to intervene); D. MD.
CIv. R. 105.11 (permitting "interested parties" to file objections); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3) (allowing "any
person" to intervene). Texas and Maryland both require courts to wait fourteen days after notice is
posted before issuing a sealing order. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(4); D. MD. Civ. R. 105.11. New Jersey, which
requires electronic filing of motions to seal, requires courts to provide at least one day between posting
and sealing. D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(c)(l)-(4).
116. See D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(c)(2), (5) (any court order on a motion to seal "shall include
findings" on whether a "clearly defined and serious injury... would result if the relief sought is not
granted, and ... why a less restrictive alternative to the relief sought is not available"); D. MD. Civ. R.
105.11 (motions to seal must be supported by "specific factual representations to justify the sealing"
and provide "an explanation why alternatives to sealing would not provide sufficient protection"); TEX.
R. Crv. P. 76a(l)(b), (6) (any sealing order must provide "specific reasons for finding and concluding"
that the necessary showing for sealing has been made, including whether "no less restrictive means than
sealing records will adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted").
117. See McGonigle, supra note 81. The investigation found 282 sealed cases in Dallas County
since 1920, 202 of which had been sealed since 1980 and 35 in 1986 alone. Judges "routinely sealed the
cases at the mutual requests of the parties without extensively questioning the need to seal them." Id.
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lic, including lead poisoning, lethally defective products, doctors sexually
assaulting their patients, and "sensitive" issues involving politically con-
nected parties."i8 The Dallas Morning News stories were followed by re-
ports of sealed cases in other parts of the state, including one case
involving a San Antonio priest charged with sexual abuse, 1 19 and another
involving a psychiatrist in Austin accused of drugging and raping one of
his patients.12
0
In the wake of these reports, the Texas legislature passed a law requir-
ing the Texas Supreme Court to adopt rules "establishing guidelines for the
courts of this state to use in determining whether in the interests of justice
the records in a civil case, including settlements, should be sealed."' 121 The
Texas Supreme Court responded by holding a series of public hearings in
which lengthy and heated disputes broke out over whether any new rule
should address unfiled discovery. 122 Part II of this Article describes this
controversy and how Rule 76a attempts to address some forms of litigant-
centered information. Rule 76a's application to judicial information, on the
other hand, quickly achieved broad support from all quarters of the legal
community.
12 3
The rule, which was enacted in 1990 and has not been amended since,
begins with a categorical declaration: "No court order or opinion issued in
the adjudication of a case may be sealed."'124 This blanket ban is an en-
dorsement of the principle that when a court formally invokes its powers, it
may not do so behind closed doors. The rule then provides:
Other court records, as defined in this rule, are presumed to be open to
the general public and may be sealed only upon a showing of all of the
following:
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
(1) this presumption of openness;
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety;
118. See id.; see also Steve McGonigle, Sealed Lawsuits Deal with Poisonings, Sex, Surgery,
DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Nov. 23, 1987, at IA.
119. See Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Jul. 15, 1989, at 26 (comments
of Harry L. Tindall) (on file with author).
120. Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Hearing, Nov. 30, 1989, at 180 (comments of Charles Bab-
cock) (on file with author).
121. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (Vernon 2004).
122. See Memorandum from Chuck Herring, Co-Chair, Supreme Court Advisory Committee's Ad
Hoc Subcommittee on Court Sealing, to Texas Supreme Court, Mar. 5, 1990 [hereinafter Herring
Memo] (on file with author).
123. See id.
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l). See Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public
Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643 (1991).
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(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and ef-
fectively protect the specific interest asserted. 
12 5
These requirements approximate the first tier test which courts have
used in First Amendment sealing cases, but Texas applies them to all court
records, with exceptions only for documents filed in camera for the pur-
pose of a discoverability ruling, documents whose access is otherwise re-
stricted by law, and records in family law cases. 126 Lloyd Doggett, the
Texas Supreme Court justice credited as the driving force behind the rule,
explained that the purpose of requiring a "specific, serious and substantial
interest" in order to seal was to avoid generalized claims "such as promot-
ing settlement, avoiding injury to reputation, [or] expediting discovery."127
The court also wanted to ensure that judges had no choice but to apply the
rule's two-part test, so the court rejected a proposal by members of the
state's intellectual property bar to include a list of presumptively protect-
able interests such as privacy and trade secrets. 128 Doggett explained that if
trial judges were given such a list, they likely "would not apply the balanc-
ing test but would merely authorize secrecy for any documents that fell
within the enumerated categories."
129
The court also recognized that laying out standards for sealing was not
enough, and that "openness guarantees would be meaningless without
proper procedural safeguards and a mechanism for the public to enforce its
right of access." 130 Rule 76a therefore requires a party wishing to seal a
court record to file a written motion with the trial court that is accessible on
the court's public docket, 131 and to post detailed notice of the motion with
both the trial court and the Texas Supreme Court. 132 The dual posting was
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
126. TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a(2)(a). During deliberations over the rule, the chair of the Family Law
Section of the State Bar of Texas asserted that because family law disputes often involve "sensitive
personal information," records in these cases should be excluded from the rule's application. See Letter
from Scott T. Cook, Chairman, Family Law Section of State Bar of Tex., to Hon. Nathan L. Hecht, Tex.
Supreme Court (Mar. 22, 1990). This Article does not explore the unique issues that arise in connection
with court secrecy and family law matters. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Emily
Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or
Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 155 (1999).
127. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 668-69.
128. See Letter from Gale R. Peterson, Cox & Smith, Inc., to Hon. Raul A. Gonzales, Associate
Justice, Tex. Supreme Court (Mar. 4, 1990) (on file with author).
129. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 668 n.1 17.
130. Id. at 678.
131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3) ("Court records may be sealed only upon a party's written motion,
which shall be open to public inspection.").
132. Id. The rule states:
The movant shall post a public notice at the place where notices for meetings of county gov-
ernmental bodies are required to be posted, stating: that a hearing will be held in open court
on a motion to seal court records in the specific case; that any person may intervene and be
heard concerning the sealing of court records; the specific time and place of the hearing; the
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necessary to ensure that "the capitol press and public interest groups based
in Austin will be made aware of the proposed sealing" and to create a data-
base concerning the extent of secrecy requests statewide.133 No earlier than
fourteen days after the notice is posted, the court must hold an open hearing
on the sealing request where "any person" is given the right to intervene for
the purpose of challenging the request to seal. 134 If the court grants the
request, its order must be open to the public and explain the "specific rea-
sons for finding and concluding" that the proper showing had been
made. 135 Sealing orders (as well as decisions not to seal) are considered
severed from the underlying case and are immediately appealable by any
party present at the hearing. 136 The goals of the procedure were to ensure
not only that no court could sign off on a sealing order out of expediency or
simply because the parties agreed to it, but also to force courts to "do it
right the first time," as opposed to requiring interested parties to try to open
documents that had already been sealed.137
Even with these up-front procedures, however, the Texas Supreme
Court was concerned that after a sealing request was granted, circum-
style and number of the case; a brief but specific description of both the nature of the case and
the records which are sought to be sealed; and the identity of the movant. Immediately after
posting such notice, the movant shall file a verified copy of the posted notice with the clerk of
the court in which the case is pending and with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas.
Id.
133. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 679.
134. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(3) ("[A]ny person may intervene and be heard concerning the sealing of
court records."); TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a(4) ("A hearing, open to the public, on a motion to seal court
records shall be held in open court as soon as practicable, but not less than fourteen days after the
motion is filed and notice is posted. Any party may participate in the hearing. Non-parties may inter-
vene as a matter of right for the limited purpose of participating in the proceedings, upon payment of
the fee required for filing a plea in intervention. The court may inspect records in camera when neces-
sary. The court may determine a motion relating to sealing or unsealing court records in accordance
with the procedures prescribed by Rule 120a.").
135. TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a(6) ("A motion relating to sealing or unsealing court records shall be
decided by written order, open to the public, which shall state: the style and number of the case; the
specific reasons for finding and concluding whether the showing required by paragraph 1, has been
made; the specific portions of court records which are to be sealed; and the time period for which the
sealed portions of the court records are to be sealed. The order shall not be included in any judgment or
other order but shall be a separate document in the case; however, the failure to comply with this re-
quirement shall not affect its appealability.").
136. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76(a)(8) ("Any order (or portion of an order or judgment) relating to sealing or
unsealing court records shall be deemed to be severed from the case and a final judgment which may be
appealed by any party or intervenor who participated in the hearing preceding issuance of such order.
The appellate court may abate the appeal and order the trial court to direct that further public notice be
given, or to hold further hearings, or to make additional findings.").
137. See Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Hearing, Nov. 30, 1989, at 216-17 (comments of Thomas
S. Leatherbury) (on file with author) ("[W]here the notice is posted, where there is an opportunity to
appear and be heard at the very outset, then ultimately you will have a lot less litigation if you do it
right the first time.").
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stances could change that would no longer warrant sealing. 138 Lawyers for
various news organizations had testified about several cases in which the
press was unable to challenge sealing orders because the trial court's ple-
nary jurisdiction had expired. 139 Rule 76a therefore gives courts continuing
jurisdiction over sealing orders and allows intervenors to try to unseal court
records "at any time before or after judgment," so long as they did not have
"actual notice" of any prior request to seal. 140
Based on the limited empirical evidence available, Rule 76a appears in
practice to have worked as intended (at least as it applies to judicial infor-
mation). In the fifteen years since the rule's enactment, trial judges have
relied on it to prevent parties from stipulating to the sealing of court re-
cords, and the written judgment and immediate appeal provisions have
enabled appellate courts to strike down sealing orders in which the trial
court did not sufficiently weigh the public interest. The rule has been used
to unseal a complaint in a high-profile case involving a prominent law
firm's attempt to break its lease; 14 1 to refuse the attempt of the Burlington
Northern Railroad Company to have sealed the entire record of a case it
had lost; 142 to reject Compaq Computer's request to seal all documents
filed in connection with plaintiffs' motion for class action certification in a
case involving allegedly faulty computer equipment; 143 to overturn a trial
court's order sealing an audit report in a securities fraud case;144 and to
overturn a trial court's decision to seal the record of an entire trial at the
request of the parties.145
In addition, journalists used Rule 76a to gain access to settlement in-
formation in two cases involving the sexual abuse of minors. 146 In both
138. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 681 (expressing desire to ensure that sealing
orders "will not exist indefinitely without the possibility of future intervention, when secrecy is no
longer justified").
139. See Herring Memo, supra note 122.
140. TEx. R. CIv. P. 76a(7) ("Any person may intervene as a matter of right at any time before or
after judgment to seal or unseal court records. A court that issues a sealing order retains continuing
jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that order. An order sealing or unsealing court records shall not
be reconsidered on motion of any party or intervenor who had actual notice of the hearing preceding
issuance of the order, without first showing changed circumstances materially affecting the order. Such
circumstances need not be related to the case in which the order was issued. However, the burden of
making the showing required by paragraph 1, shall always be on the party seeking to seal records.").
141. Boardman v. Elm Block Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 872 S.W.2d 297, 297-98, 300 (Tex. App. 1994).
142. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 905 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. App. 1995).
143. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 75 S.W.3d 669, 670-72 (Tex. App. 2002).
144. True & Sewell, P.C. v. Arkoma Basin Res., Inc., No. 05-99-00692-CV, 1999 WL 970924, at
*1 (Tex. App. Oct. 26, 1999).
145. Stroud Oil Props., Inc. v. Henderson, No. 2-03-003-CV, 2003 WL 21404820, at *1, *3 (Tex.
App. June 19, 2003).
146. Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 501-02 (Tex. App. 1993); Fox v. Doe, 869 S.W.2d 507,
509 (Tex. App. 1993).
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cases, trial courts had approved the parties' requests to file their settlement
agreements under seal. 147 (Texas law requires courts to approve settlements
involving minors.148) Journalists intervened pursuant to Rule 76a, and on
appeal, the appellate court struck down the section of the sealing order in
one case relating to information about the alleged assailants and the terms
of the settlement agreements, and upheld provisions that excluded similar
information from the sealing order in the other case. 149 Notably, however,
the courts upheld the sealing of the victims' names and any identifying
materials, finding that such information was the kind of "specific, serious,
and substantial" interest Rule 76a was designed to protect.150
The rule therefore appears to have had its desired effect of requiring
judges to apply the balancing test and consider the public interest even
when both parties agree to secrecy. Furthermore, while some opponents of
the rule's enactment objected to its cumbersome procedures, 151 in practice
the rule appears not to have been administratively difficult to implement. 1
52
An early study of the rule showed that of the first 202 cases with Rule 76a
hearings, only 11 resulted in written appellate opinions, and 5 of these dealt
with specific gaps in the understanding of the rule that have subsequently
been resolved. 153 Moreover, the rule's continuing-jurisdiction provision
also has proven to be unproblematic. Although critics had argued that the
rule's broad grant of "never-ending" jurisdiction would mean "you could
have 18 different appeals by 18 different intervenors if each come in at
different times," 154 as of this writing, there are no reported cases showing
more than one requested intervention pursuant to Rule 76a. 155 This track
record may stem from courts strictly enforcing the requirement that if a
147. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 503; Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 510.
148. See Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 705 (Tex. App. 1994).
149. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 501, 507; Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 509, 510, 512-13.
150. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d at 507; Doe, 869 S.W.2d at 512.
151. See, e.g., Letter from Larry S. Milner, President & Chief Executive Officer, Tex. Chamber of
Commerce, to Hon. Nathan L. Hecht, Tex. Supreme Court (Mar. 30, 1990) (on file with author); Letter
from Ronald R. Kranzow, Senior Vice President & Legal Counsel, Frito-Lay, Inc., to Hon. Nathan L.
Hecht, Tex. Supreme Court (Mar. 2, 1990) (on file with author); Letter from Jack D. Maroney, Brown
Maroney & Oaks Hartline, to Hon. Nathan L. Hecht, Tex. Supreme Court (Feb. 28, 1990) (on file with
author).
152. See Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Mar. 4, 2004, at 11277, 11279
(on file with author) (discussing the lack of administrative problems in enacting and enforcing the rule).
153. See Robert C. Nissen, Note, Open Court Records in Products Liability Litigation Under Texas
Rule 76a, 72 TEX. L. REV. 931, 953 (1994).
154. Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Feb. 16, 1990, at 111 (comments
of Russell McMains) (on file with author).
155. Based on search of Westlaw and LexisNexis.
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third party has "actual notice" of a Rule 76a hearing, it cannot subsequently
intervene. 156
Most importantly, the rule also appears to have deterred parties from
routinely requesting to seal judicial information. Texas courts dispose of
more than 850,000 civil cases a year, 157 and yet from the rule's inception in
1990 through the end of 2005, there were a total of only 1,527 Rule 76a
filings-an average of about 100 per year. 158 Requests to seal court records
pursuant to the rule thus occur in less than one out of every 8,000 cases. At
a recent hearing of the Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee, one
member said, "[O]ur consensus here is that, although there are very few
filings, [Rule 76a] seems to be functioning well; and the newspapers are
not angry and the TV stations are not angry." 159
E. Conclusions
In many courts and states, the currently predominant rules governing
the sealing of judicial information attempt to protect the public's First
Amendment and common law rights of access by requiring courts to con-
sider the public's interest in access before granting any request to seal. In
the Eleventh Circuit, for example, it has been the law since 1992 that trial
courts are not permitted to seal settlement agreements unless the request to
seal is "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to that interest," and judges' sealing orders must be articulated in
findings. 160 Yet the FJC study found that from 2001 to 2002, the Southern
District of Florida, located in the Eleventh Circuit, sealed 111 settlement
agreements that were filed with the court, many of which involved claims
of sexual harassment, labor violations, and products liability, without pro-
viding any publicly available findings whatsoever. 161 Secrecy, by its na-
ture, is hard to measure, but the limited evidence available suggests that the
156. See Pub. Citizen v. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tex. App. 1992) ("We
believe that Rule 76a(7) prevents an interested non-party such as Public Citizen from waiting on the
sidelines until a court issues an order, and then, if dissatisfied with the outcome, intervening and forcing
the parties and court to relitigate the issue.").
157. Angela L. Garcia, Judicial Info. Manager, Office of Court Admin., Tex. Supreme Court, Total
Number of Civil Cases Disposed of in Texas 2003-2005 (on file with author).
158. Lisa Hobbs, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Supreme Court, Rule 76a Filings Since Sept. 1, 1990 (on file
with author).
159. Transcript, Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Mar. 4, 2004, at 11279 (on file with
author).
160. Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11 th Cir. 1992) (quoting Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
161. See FJC 2004 REPORT, supra note 82, C24-C35.
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existing legal standards, while rigorous on paper, fail to adequately protect
the public's interest in access to judicial information.
One way to respond to this problem is through the South Carolina
model, which attempts to "take secrecy off the table" by banning it alto-
gether. But Judge Anderson's acknowledgment of his court's "escape
valve" shows that a categorical prohibition goes too far. In some instances,
such as when valid trade secrets are at risk, the public's interest in protect-
ing confidentiality may outweigh its interest in openness. Judges in South
Carolina, therefore, despite Local Rule 5.03(E), will still have to face the
"incredible pressure" of litigants pressing for secrecy.
A second response to the problem of judges failing to properly weigh
the competing public interests at stake is to create "a mechanism for the
public to enforce its right of access."' 162 Texas and the federal districts of
New Jersey and Maryland have tried to ensure that judges are not always
the only ones in the room responsible for giving voice to public interests.
The rules of these jurisdictions-which require parties to post notice of
requests to seal, give public representatives a meaningful opportunity to
intervene, and force judges to justify sealing orders in writing-make it
much more likely that courts will fully weigh the public's interest in access
before issuing a sealing order.
Given the apparent success that Texas has had with Rule 76a's appli-
cation to judicial information, other states and courts should explore insti-
tuting similar rules. The costs of the procedure are minimal (notice can be
done through courts' websites), and the payoff is substantial: ensuring that
"those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public
responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with
his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed."' 163
II. THE RULES GOVERNING LITIGANT-CENTERED INFORMATION
A. The Public Interest in Litigant-Centered Information
As important as it is for courts to institute rules protecting the right of
access to judicial information, the vast majority of secrecy in civil litiga-
tion, including that which occurred in Frankl and in many of the Catholic
Church and Ford/Firestone cases, involves litigant-centered information. 164
162. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 678.
163. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
164. See Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L.
REv. 883, 886-87 (2004).
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This category of information, defined as materials generated through court
processes but that are not the subject of judicial decision-making, comes in
two forms: discovery, whether or not filed, that has been exchanged be-
tween the parties but has not been attached to a court motion, and settle-
ment agreements that are neither approved of nor enforced by a court. The
chief public interest in granting public access to judicial information-
allowing public scrutiny of judicial decision-making-is not a factor with
litigant-centered information because judges play little, if any, role in over-
seeing its production. 1
65
But those who advocate the position that unfiled discovery and pri-
vately reached settlements do not implicate public concerns ignore the pub-
lic's interests in viewing evidence of wrongdoing or misconduct,
preventing parties from buying and selling the concealment of wrongdoing,
and ensuring that courts place the enforcement resources of the state behind
secrecy only when there is sufficient justification.
Americans turn to their court systems not only to resolve disputes, but
also as a means of producing information useful to society. Unlike many
European countries, which largely depend on administrative agencies to
enforce the law, the United States relies to a great extent on its system of
civil litigation to expose wrongdoing.166 States and the federal government
tend to respond to regulatory needs not by creating new bureaucracies-
which can be co-opted by the targets of their enforcement-but rather by
passing laws that impose new forms of civil liability, leaving enforcement
in private hands. 167 As Professor Paul Carrington puts it, "[D]iscovery is
the American alternative to the administrative state."
168
Of course, discovery is an unwieldy tool, producing large amounts of
information that the public actually may have an interest in not seeing. In
an environmental hazards case, for instance, discovery may require the
turning over of third party medical records, which the litigants may need to
estimate damages. The interests of privacy weigh heavily in favor of keep-
165. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457,
472 (1991) (In discovery, "the role of the court, where the court takes a role at all, is as a manager of the
litigation and not as a producer of information."); Dor6, supra note 110, at 817 ("Public access to
unfiled discovery.., does not assist the public in monitoring or understanding a court's primary adju-
dicative function.").
166. See Paul D. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for Draftsmen of
Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 456, 457 (2000) (arguing that since at least the 1960s,
federal courts have "replaced administrative agencies as the preferred means of enforcing much of our
national law," especially as compared to the United States's European counterparts).
167. See id.
168. Id. at 459. See also Stephen N. Subrin, A New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648, 1651 (1981) (arguing that the creation of uniform federal rules with liberal pleading requirements
and discovery provisions reflected New Deal values by facilitating public litigation).
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ing such records confidential. On the other hand, discovery also can gener-
ate information of vital public importance about, for example, the hazard-
ous nature of a product or a company's longstanding practice of
discrimination. 169 Information revealed through discovery is often of far
greater interest to the public than is publicly accessible judicial information
such as complaints because some discovery materials, e.g., internal com-
pany memos detailing the number of injury reports generated by a given
product, have the potential to verify allegations of wrongdoing. 1
70
If such information tended to come out at trial, little reason would ex-
ist to give the public access to it as discovery. But the proportion of cases
in the United States that go to trial has dropped precipitously in the past
several decades, at both the state and federal level. 171 The decline in the
number of tort trials has been especially steep: in 1962, one in six tort cases
went to trial; by 2002, only one in forty-six was tried. 172 As a greater per-
centage of litigation takes place outside of the courtroom, courts are in-
creasingly unable to fulfill their role as revealers of societally useful
information. 173
Some commentators argue that we should not expect courts to act as
ombudsmen, especially in areas like consumer safety where regulators have
169. See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles ofAdministra-
tive, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 973 (2001) ("[P]rivate litigation is good at
exposing bad acts. As contrasted with the Continental and English civil systems, which place premiums
on secrecy and confidentiality, U.S. courts provide for liberal discovery rules, open courtrooms, and
presumptions in favor of unsealing documents that may involve the public interest. The U.S. court
system is able to make bad acts visible and subject to public discussion in ways that administrative
FOIA requests sometimes cannot.").
170. The American presumption that the pleadings of a case are public as soon as they are filed
with the court-regardless of whether a judge has read them, let alone factored them into a decision-
supports the notion that one function of the system of civil litigation in the U.S. is to reveal accusations
of wrongdoing. In Great Britain, by contrast, the pleadings in a case are presumptively private, accessi-
ble only through the permission of the court. See Ian Grainger, Public Access to Court Files, 24 Ctv.
JUST. Q. 304, 304 (2005).
171. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examing Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPERICAL
LEGAL STUD. 755, 776 app.B (2004) (finding that the number of state court civil trials in the twenty-two
states studied dropped from 36.1 percent in 1976 to 15.8 percent in 2002); Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting that 1.8 percent of federal civil cases went to
trial in 2002, one-sixth of the 1962 rate).
172. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May Mean,
Disp. RESOL. MAG. 3 (Summer 2004).
173. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puz-
zles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 787 ("[C]ourts' practices and
processes are increasingly private, prompting the question of whether to insist, as some state legisla-
tures are now doing, on public access to information about outcomes in certain kinds of disputes.").
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investigatory and enforcement powers not available to courts. 174 Evidence
suggests, however, that the opposite is true and that court secrecy in fact
contributes to the impotency of government regulators. In an article defend-
ing South Carolina's ban on sealed settlements, Judge Anderson describes
the ineffectiveness of the Consumer Product Safety Act, which requires
manufacturers to report to the Consumer Product Safety Commission
("CPSC") whenever a product is the subject of three verdicts or settlements
arising out of claims of death or serious bodily injury. 175 Between 1991,
when the reporting requirement began, and 2002, only 551 reports were
filed with the CPSC, even though during this same period, more than
150,000 product liability lawsuits were filed in federal court-and this
represents a small fraction of the number of state cases. 176 Judge Anderson
suggests that one explanation for this "massive under-reporting" may be
that "litigants hide behind gag orders issued by the court at settlement."'1 77
Such hiding is made possible by courts that fail to recognize a poten-
tial public interest in discovery. The tenet that discovery is private gives
bad actors the option on the eve of trial, or just before the filing of a sub-
stantive motion that would attach damaging information, to avoid any dis-
closure of their wrongdoing. They can do this by buying secrecy from their
opponents in the form of a larger settlement offer.178
In other contexts, contracts that involve paying someone to remain si-
lent about another person's wrongful conduct are generally unenforceable
and potentially criminal. 179 The Model Penal Code and most state laws list
as a crime "accept[ing] or agree[ing] to accept any pecuniary benefit in
consideration of refraining from reporting to law enforcement authorities
the commission or suspected commission of any offense or information
relating to an offense. ' 180 These laws reflect society's disapproval of
agreements to conceal wrongdoing. In addition, legal ethics codes prevent
lawyers from agreeing as part of a settlement contract not to represent fu-
174. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 165, at 481 ("[T]he argument that courts should identify and
publicize information obtained through discovery relating to public health overstates the role of courts
in product liability litigation because courts do not have the kinds of powers regulators wield.").
175. Anderson, supra note 80, at 733-34.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 733.
178. See Weinstein, supra note 80, at 511 ("It is not unusual for a defendant to 'sweeten' the set-
tlement offer to plaintiffs on condition of secrecy. The defendant may threaten the plaintiff with a
lengthy and expensive trial to coerce confidentiality.... Since the ethical rules require that attorneys
obtain a swift and optimal recovery for their clients, the plaintiff's attorney seems to have little choice
but to accept a favorable settlement offer on secrecy terms.").
179. See Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal
Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 783, 793 (2002).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (2001).
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ture clients in related litigation. 181 Underlying these rules is the notion that
lawyer services are "public goods" that cannot be sacrificed to the interests
of the parties. 182 The principles behind these state and lawyer rules should
apply with equal force to information generated through the court-
mandated process of discovery. Once a court has ordered documents which
reveal societally useful information to be produced, the public has an inter-
est in ensuring that parties cannot then bargain among themselves to keep
that information secret.
The public also has an interest in ensuring that secrecy does not distort
the judicial system. Although a blanket rule making all discovery public
could enable potential plaintiffs to extort large pay-outs by threatening to
file lawsuits, the current system fosters "perverse incentives to file suit" by
allowing plaintiffs to sell what they learn in discovery. 183 This "undercuts
the efficiency of tort law, employment law, and every other kind of law that
allows private causes of action" by "overcompensat[ing] victims and some-
times compensat[ing] those who have not been victimized at all."
184
Giving parties the ability to treat discovery like a private commodity,
therefore, has several deleterious effects on the court system: it protects
those who engage in misconduct, rewards those who use the courts as a
form of extortion, and leaves potential future victims vulnerable. 185 These
outcomes are enabled by the routine granting of protective orders. As a
result, courts are placing their stamps of approval-accompanied by the
coercive power of contempt-on the concealment, giving the appearance of
judicial complicity in the wrongdoing and thus damaging public confidence
in the courts.
The public, therefore, has three concrete interests in being able to ac-
cess at least some forms of litigant-centered information: to view evidence
of misconduct, to prevent parties from purchasing the concealment of
wrongdoing, and to ensure that courts do not use judicial power to sanction
this concealment.
It is important to note, however, that these interests do not necessarily
extend to the content of settlement agreements themselves. Typically, a
private settlement contract will contain a dollar figure-which may be un-
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2003) ("A lawyer shall not participate in
offering or making ... an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the
settlement of a client controversy.").
182. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2624
(1995).
183. See Koniak, supra note 179, at 803.
184. Id.
185. See Weinstein, supra note 80, at 516-17.
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related to the merits of the action-and the terms of the settlement's en-
forcement; it is unlikely to contain the kind of information related to the
merits of a dispute that makes discovery material of interest to the public.
In the Frankl case, for example, the fact that the parties settled for $4.7
million does not necessarily indicate whether the tires at issue were dan-
gerous. The public's interest was not, therefore, in viewing the settlement
contract, but rather in: 1) seeing the discovery documents that allegedly
revealed whether there was an "ongoing safety issue" with the tire; 2) pre-
venting the parties from agreeing to cover up the tire's alleged dangers; and
3) not having such concealment enforced by a judicial protective order.
The public's interest in access to litigant-centered information must
also be balanced by countervailing interests in protecting privacy and en-
suring that courts remain efficient and inexpensive forums in which to re-
solve disputes. Because pretrial discovery is so sweeping in its scope,
requiring the production of all materials relevant to the claims brought
regardless of whether they would be admissible in court, the privacy con-
cerns in regard to public access are especially acute. Discovery can reveal
"intensely personal and confidential information, such as medical records,
marital information, religious documents, financial records, and even trade
secrets or intellectual property."' 186 A broad public right of access to dis-
covery could put this information at risk of widespread exposure and create
incentives for plaintiffs to file baseless lawsuits solely as a means to
threaten release of materials not meant to be public.
The sweeping scope of discovery also raises administrative problems.
One reason litigants readily accede to broad discovery requests may be that
they easily can get protective orders ensuring the information produced will
not be made public; without guarantees of secrecy, litigants may fight
every step of the way.' 87 Removing judicial protection of discovery there-
fore could result in an increase in the "number of litigated discovery dis-
putes," which would "ultimately restrict the actual flow of discovery
information."1 88
186. Miller, supra note 27, at 466.
187. See id. at 428 (stating that curtailing judicial discretion to enter protective orders "would
wreak havoc on the efficient functioning of the litigation process"); see also Rex K. Linder, President's
Page: Assault on Protective Orders, 66 DEF. COJNs. J. 165, 165 (1999) ("If confidentiality cannot be
protected, parties will be inclined to fight production of documents that may be sensitive or confidential
rather than risk their indiscriminate disclosure.").
188. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Oct. 20-21, 1994, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvlO-20.htm. See also Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham,
Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Herb Kohl, U.S. Senator (Oct. 3, 2002) (on file with author)
(arguing that restrictions on judicial discretion to enter protective orders could "unnecessarily compli-
cate discovery practices, increase cost, and prove counterproductive").
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These concerns can be overstated, however. Evidence suggests that
litigants in complex cases already fight tooth-and-nail over discovery and
already spend the resources to inspect every document that gets turned
over. 189 In addition, one study showed that protective orders are requested
in only five to ten percent of the cases filed in federal court in the districts
examined, and of these cases, only ten to twenty percent involved personal
injury. 190 Forcing judges to make more particularized findings before issu-
ing protective orders, therefore, may affect only a small percentage of the
federal docket and have little effect on current litigation practice.
On the other hand, a rule that requires the public filing of all discovery
would surely precipitate a much larger number of requests for protective
orders and could deter some potential litigants from filing suit. 191 The an-
swer to such concerns, however, is not to insist that all discovery materials
remain private, but rather to craft a regime that balances the desire for an
efficient system of litigation and the protection of legitimate privacy inter-
ests with the public's interests in accessing litigant-centered information.
B. The Rules Governing Access to Litigant-Centered Information
1. History
Prior to the advent of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, what
we know of now as discovery didn't exist. Rather, the early shape of cases
was determined by the pleadings, which, at common law, consisted of the
oral exchange in court between the plaintiff and defendant, with the goal of
ascertaining the nature of the complaint and the points in controversy.
192
The pleadings generally took place in open court, but only the final plead-
189. See Landon Thomas Jr., Jury Tallies Morgan's Total at $1.45 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2005, at C1 (describing Morgan Stanley's attempts to obstruct the discovery process in a business
litigation).
190. See ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., PROTECTIVE ORDER ACTIVITY IN THREE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL DISTRICTS: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3, 13 tbl. 13 (1996).
191. The risk of driving some litigants out of the court system is real. After Florida and Texas
passed their rules, proponents of alternative dispute resolution began peddling to businesses their pri-
vately-run forums, where even the existence of claims "generally escapes the knowledge of the news
media and the general public." See William H. Schroder Jr., Private ADR May Offer Increased Confi-
dentiality: Business Concerned with the 'Sunshine in Litigation' Movement May Find ADR to Be At-
tractive, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1994, at C14 (encouraging businesses to turn to ADR because of the
"rising risk of the destruction of the confidentiality of valuable business information in the U.S. judicial
system"); see also Kathleen L. Blaner, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Courts Deny Protection for
Confidential Information, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 21 (2003) (suggesting that anti-secrecy rules will force
businesses and litigants to turn to private forms of dispute resolution).
192. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 399-400 (5th
ed. 1956).
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ings were placed in the public record. 193 Depositions, taken infrequently,
were intended to preserve evidence (as opposed to gather information), and
were typically sealed. 194 Early cases indicate, however, that sealing of
depositions was intended only to ensure accuracy and that they were to be
filed with the court and made available to the public in advance of trial
when possible. 195
Drawing lessons from this early history is difficult, given the dramatic
changes in litigaton brought about by the enactment of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. But what is clear is that under the common law, the scope of
judicial information to which the public had access-by attending trial-
was greater than exists in today's world of nearly trial-free litigation. 196 At
the same time, the Rules of Civil Procedure had the effect of vastly enlarg-
ing the amount of litigant-centered information by requiring parties to turn
over at the outset of a case materials that had traditionally been considered
private. 197
In his influential article opposing efforts to place restrictions on
courts' abilities to enter protective orders, Professor Arthur Miller argues
that the public's right of access to court proceedings "has never been ex-
tended beyond the confines of the courtroom and court documents" and
that the discovery process was intended to "avoid surprise at trial," not to
"enlarge the public's access to information."' 198 Others have expressed
similar sentiments. 199 Even if the Rules of Civil Procedure were not meant
increase the public pool of court-generated information, however, it does
193. See id.
194. See Katie Eccles, Note, The Agent Orange Case: A Flawed Interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Granting Pretrial Access to Discovery, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1593-94 (1990).
195. See Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Marden, Orth & Hastings Co., 280 F. 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1922)
("[Since] the parties to the litigation would know, or, in any event, would have the right to know, the
contents of the deposition, there was not the slightest reason why the deposition should not be placed
upon the files of the court and become accessible to the litigants, and for that matter to the public."); see
also Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1112 ("English law and federal law in America have long afforded litigants
some ability to obtain depositions of witnesses and documents.").
196. See Luban, supra note 182, at 2647 ("The rules... transferred power from judges to lawyers,
who litigate... largely outside the scrutiny of the trial judge and almost entirely outside the scrutiny of
appellate courts.").
197. See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 679 (Wash. 1982) ("[B]y requiring a party
to submit to the searching inquiries of discovery, the courts have required him to give information about
himself which he would otherwise have no obligation to disclose. A realm of privacy which courts had
previously left undisturbed was now opened.").
198. Miller, supra note 27, at 429, 447.
199. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[D]ur-
ing the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never
occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other
than wholly private to the litigants."); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litiga-
tion, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1983).
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not necessarily follow that discovery was intended to take place wholly in
private. Walling off discovery from the public could actually shrink the
public's access to information by moving much of what used to happen
inside public courts into private law offices, a result not likely intended by
the drafters of the rules.
In addition, early articles about the motivations for the rules and the
uses of discovery provide no indication one way or the other as to whether
the fruits of discovery were intended to be presumptively public or pri-
vate.200 Case law also does not provide a conclusive answer, although sev-
eral early cases suggest that discovery was presumed to be public absent a
protective order.201 Moreover, Professor Miller's own treatise states that
while depositions were historically taken in private, "[t]raditionally, a
200. See Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863
(1933); Edson R Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV.
737 (1939); Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
MICH. L. REv. 205 (1942); William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60
YALE L.J. 1132 (1951). Professor Speck's study of the first fifteen years of discovery practice provides
one of the few early discussions of public access to discovery, but it is inconclusive as to whether
discovery was presumptively private or public. The study concludes:
Apparently, discovery is not used to pry into private affairs. Occasionally it is said that a suit
is a mere pretense to take advantage of discovery, and that parallel suits are brought in state
and federal courts to take advantage of more liberal federal discovery. No such instances were
found, and the attorneys mentioned "prying" more as a theoretical possibility than as an actu-
ality. Persons from whom discovery is sought fear that it will bring out illegal activities, trade
secrets, or simply embarrassing facts. Unfortunately when a person becomes involved in liti-
gation much material that he would ordinarily like to keep private becomes of judicial con-
cem, and the person subject to discovery is likely to value his desire for privacy higher than
he values the judicial interest in full disclosure. Judges endeavor to limit discovery to the
needs of the lawsuit and have declined to permit use of federal discovery for ulterior pur-
poses. But the probability that litigation will bring out relevant material that a party would
prefer to keep hidden certainly influences decisions to sue or settle.
Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 407, 410-11 (N.D.N.Y. 1973)
(allowing non-parties to have access to discovery materials in patent infringement case); Davis v.
Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[P]re-trial proceedings of the federal judicial system are
conducted in public and become part of the public record unless some compelling reason exists for
denying public access to such proceedings."); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D.
308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ("[A]s a general proposition, trial and pre-trial proceedings of the federal
judicial system are ordinarily conducted in public."). See generally Donald J. Rendall, Jr., Protective
Orders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information: The First Amendment and Good Cause,
1980 DuKE L.J. 766, 770 (1980) ("Absent any judicial order to the contrary, discovery, like other
pretrial proceedings, is 'ordinarily to be conducted in public."') (quoting Olympic Refining Co. v.
Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964)). One reason for the lack of evidence in the early history and
case law for whether discovery was meant to be public or private may be that prior to the advent of
electronic case files, the right to "inspect and copy" court files required physical presence at the court-
house-insulating litigants and third parties from harm resulting from the dissemination of information.
The Supreme Court has referred to this difficulty in gathering paper files as "practical obscurity." See




deposition transcript has been a public document freely open to inspection
after it is filed with the clerk. '20
2
Furthermore, a close look at the history of the changes to Rule 26(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the issuance of
protective orders, and to Rule 5(d), which addresses whether discovery
should be filed with the court, reveals that neither the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, nor the Judicial Conference, nor the courts of appeals, has
been able to come to a consensus about whether discovery is, or should be,
presumptively public or private.
The interpretation of the rules is crucial because courts traditionally
have not recognized First Amendment or common law rights of public
access to unfiled discovery. (Judge John Minor Wisdom explained, "If the
purpose of the common law right of access is to check judicial abuses, then
that right should only extend to materials upon which a judicial decision is
based. ' 203) But beginning in 1978 with the Seventh Circuit's decision in
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Grady,204 several courts have
found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a statutory right of access to
discovery proceedings.205 The basis for these rulings was that because Rule
26(c) requires a court to find good cause before entering a protective order,
"the obverse" must also be true: "if good cause is not shown, the discovery
materials in question should not receive judicial protection and therefore
would be open to the public for inspection." 206
202. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2042 (2d ed. 1994).
The treatise notes, however, that "the reality has for some time been that no such public record is made
in many instances." Id.
203. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). Courts
have held that First Amendment rights are implicated when courts prevent a party from disseminating
information that it has learned in discovery, see, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37
(1984) ("The Court today recognizes that pretrial protective orders ... are subject to scrutiny under the
First Amendment.") (Brennan, J., concurring), but that is a separate question from whether the public
has a right, independent of the parties, to access discovery materials.
204. 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978).
205. See, e.g., id. at 596; Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the advisory committee notes indicate that discovery
proceedings are presumptively open unless otherwise ordered by the court."); Pub. Citizen v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780, 788-90 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that public has presumptive right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) and 26(c) to inspect discovery materials filed with the district
court and that "[t]he effect of... nonfiling was to deny the public the right it would otherwise have had
to inspect freely the discovery materials in this case"); Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincin-
nati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Most cases endorse a presumption of public access to
discovery materials."); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.
1999) ("It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to
the contrary, presumptively public.").
206. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987). See also Linda
Greenhouse, Judicial Conference Rejects More Secrecy in Civil Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at
B9 (quoting Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, then chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference,
explaining that despite the Conference's sanction of the issuance of stipulated protective orders, secrecy
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Courts also relied on Rule 5(d), which until 2000 required parties to
file discovery materials unless the court ordered otherwise. 20 7 The 1980
Advisory Committee notes accompanying Rule 5(d) state that the Commit-
tee had considered banning the filing of discovery absent a court order to
file (a policy many courts had adopted as local rules), but rejected the pro-
posal because discovery materials "are sometimes of interest to those who
may have no access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as
members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally. ' '208
The Second Circuit, in In re Agent Orange Litigation, concluded that these
notes meant that "the general public be afforded access to discovery mate-
rials whenever possible. ' '2
09
In 2000, however, the Advisory Committee adopted the proposal it
had rejected in 1980 and changed Rule 5(d) to read, "[D]iscovery requests
and responses must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the
court orders filing. '210 According to the Advisory Committee notes and
minutes of the Committee's meetings as well as those of the Judicial Con-
ference, the purpose of the amendment was to alleviate the burden on court
clerks, not to change any presumption of public access. 211 Moreover, when
the Committee first proposed making the change, Judge Walter Mansfield,
then chair of the Committee, suggested that discovery be public whenever
public interests were implicated.212 He noted that "a judge would not be
expected to excuse parties from filing materials in any case in which the
public or the press has an interest, such as a Watergate or similar scan-
dal." 213
arrangements "should not just be left to the option of the parties" and that "[f]ederal courts shouldn't do
anything without just cause").
207. See FED. R. CIv. P. 5(d); FED. R. CIv. P. 5, Committee Notes on Rules-2000 Amendment.
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1980 Amendment.
209. 821 F.2dat 146.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 5, Committee Notes on Rules-2000 Amendment.
211. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 5, Committee Notes on Rules-2000 Amendment (citing the increase in
"costs and burdens" as parties make "increased use of audio- and videotaped depositions"); JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MINUTES 24, June 18-19, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june1998.pdf (citing "serious space problems" in clerks'
offices); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MINUTES 17, June
14-15, 1999, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june l999.pdf (stating that the goal of
the rule is to "alleviate the storage burdens and costs imposed on clerks' offices" and "bring the national
rule on filing into conformity with most of the present local rules and practices on the subject").
212. Walter R. Mansfield, Letter to the Editor, To Lift Paper Mountains Off the U.S. Court System,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1980, at 20.
213. Id. Judge Mansfield also explained that "should the public importance of the material not
appear until after filing has been excused, it is expected that the judge, upon motion of the press or other
interested persons, would order the parties to file the documents for inspection." Id.
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Read fairly, then, history does not suggest that the public should have
no right of access to discovery. Rather, it shows how courts and rulemakers
have struggled with the question of access since the advent of modem dis-
covery and have been unwilling to foreclose the possibility that, at least on
certain occasions, litigant-centered information should be presumptively
accessible to the public.
2. The Current Rules
Litigant-centered information is sealed from the public in two ways:
1) through private agreements that require parties to return or destroy mate-
rials that are exchanged in discovery and/or to remain silent about what
they saw; and 2) through protective orders issued during discovery. The
current law on private secrecy agreements is clear: with the exceptions of
the "sunshine" rules detailed below and those cases in which court approval
of a settlement is required, federal and state courts place no restrictions on
the ability of parties to file notices of dismissal and settle their cases se-
cretly.214
The law on protective orders and public access to unfiled discovery is
more ambiguous. As noted above, before the 2000 amendment to Rule
5(d), some courts found a statutory right of access to unfiled discovery. Yet
since the amendment, many courts have ruled that a statutory right of ac-
cess no longer exists. 215 The Second Circuit, for example, held in 2001 that
Agent Orange was no longer controlling and that the public did not have a
presumptive right of access to discovery materials.
216
Whether or not discovery is presumptively private has a critical im-
pact on what it means for a court to issue a protective order. If the public
has a presumptive right to access discovery materials, a Rule 26(c) protec-
tive order would restrain not just the parties, who are represented before the
court, but also the public, which is not a party to the suit and typically has
214. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 36.
215. See, e.g., Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886-87 (N.J. 2004).
See also SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 15 (stating that there is "no presumed right of public
access" to discovery materials). In the early 1980s, the district of Oregon had a local rule that provided
the public with access to discovery that was not on file with the court. See Marcus, supra note 199, at
14 n.61 (noting that District of Oregon Rule 120-4(b) then stated, "During the pendency of any civil
proceeding, any person may, with leave of court obtained after notice served on all parties to the action,
obtain a copy of any deposition or discovery documents not on file with the court upon payment of the
expense of the copy"). The district has since eliminated this rule. See D. OR., R. PRACTICE,
http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/Rules/LRTableofContents.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
216. SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n. II (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]o the extent that Agent
Orange relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) to find a statutory right of access to discovery
materials, we observe that the recent amendment to this rule provides no presumption of filing all
discovery materials, let alone public access to them.").
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no representative at the time of the request for the order. As a result, the
media or any other public representative would have a strong argument to
be able to intervene in all requests for protective orders. Moreover, the
"good cause" standard would necessarily have to include weighing the
public interest in access against the requesting party's interest in privacy.
Courts would therefore only rarely, if ever, be able to sign off on stipulated
umbrella protective orders that give the parties the ability to bargain away
the public's right of access. 217
One recent example demonstrating the implications of recognizing a
public right of access to discovery came in a high-profile case involving
former priest John Geoghan, who had been accused of sexually molesting
more than 130 children over thirty years and had paid millions of dollars to
secretly settle with his victims. 218 In Leary v. Geoghan,219 more than eighty
of those victims sued the Boston Archdiocese for civil damages. 220 During
discovery, depositions were taken of Cardinal Bernard Law, who had su-
pervised Geoghan for many years, and several other church officials. 221
The trial judge, citing Agent Orange for the "presumption that discovery
materials should be publicly available whenever possible," 222 permitted the
Boston Globe to intervene in the case and then ordered the public release of
the discovery materials.223 Pivotal to the judge's reasoning was the fact that
while the Massachusetts equivalent to Rule 5(d) requires that discovery not
be filed absent a court order, it also allows any "concerned citizen" to peti-
tion for access, thus affirming the public's presumptive right of access to
discovery.224
Absent such a right of access, the Boston Globe would have had no
grounds on which to intervene. If discovery is presumptively private, Rule
26(c) protective orders restrain only the actions of the parties before the
court and not the public. For example, in Oklahoma Hospital Ass'n v.
Oklahoma Publishing Co.,225 journalists attempted to have two protective
217. See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999)
("The right of access to court documents belongs to the public, and the Plaintiffs were in no position to
bargain that right away.").
218. See INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, ix, 53 (2002).
219. Nos. Civ. A. 99-0371, 99-1109, 2001 WL 1902393 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2001).
220. Id. at*l.
221. See Boston Globe, Abuse in the Catholic Church,
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/geoghan/law-deposition.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
222. See Leary, 2001 WL 1902393, at *7 (quoting Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 33, 36 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
223. Id. at *8.
224. Id. at *3-*4.
225. 748 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984).
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orders vacated in a case involving the way hospitals were being reimbursed
for Medicaid expenses.226 The Tenth Circuit held that the journalists had no
standing to intervene because the parties had stipulated to the protective
orders and the public had no right, independent of the parties, to access
discovery materials.227 Thus, in courts that view discovery as being pre-
sumptively private, the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c) should be
invoked only when one party wants to disseminate what it learned in dis-
covery.228 As a result, such courts, in theory, should weigh only the private
interests of the parties in determining whether good cause exists because no
public interest in access applies. 229
Ironically, however, even as courts increasingly have held that the
public has no right of access to discovery, they have also tried to make the
good cause requirement more rigorous-without acknowledging the incon-
sistency between the two positions. The Third Circuit, for example, does
not recognize a public right of access to discovery materials, 230 but never-
theless requires that courts, before issuing protective orders, consider "the
importance of disclosure to the public. '231 Likewise, in Grove Fresh Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., the Seventh Circuit stated that "until
admitted into the record, material uncovered during pretrial discovery is
ordinarily not within the scope of press access," but then held that the dis-
trict court erred in not allowing the media to intervene in the case to chal-
lenge the propriety of a protective order.232 These cases suggest that courts,
while willing to deny the public a right of access to discovery materials in
the abstract, may not yet be ready to accept the case-by-case implications
of that view.
The current doctrine governing litigant-centered information, there-
fore, is conflicting. Many courts recognize no public right of access to dis-
226. Id. at 1422-23.
227. Id. at 1425-26. See also Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 209 F.R.D. 201, 205 (D. Colo. 2002)
(noting that "if [a] protective order is not entered, the press may obtain access to materials produced to
plaintiff in discovery only if the plaintiff exercises his right to disseminate those materials") (emphasis
added).
228. See Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L.
& POL'Y 67, 78 (2000) (arguing that under the terms of Rule 26(c), when parties stipulate to protective
orders, the good cause requirement does not apply and courts should accept such orders should as prima
facie valid).
229. See SEDONA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 17 (stating that the good cause standard is met "as
long as the parties can articulate a legitimate need for privacy or confidentiality").
230. See Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993).
231. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Miller, supra note
27, at 433-35). The court also lamented that "[d]isturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which
contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing
public interests which are sacrificed by the orders." Id. at 785 (emphasis added).
232. 24 F.3d 893, 897-98 (7th Cir. 1994).
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covery and also hold that Rule 26(c), or its state equivalent, requires only
the consideration of the private interests of the litigants before issuing a
protective order. 233 Others, such as the Third and Seventh Circuits, require
courts to balance several factors, including whether the public has an inter-
est in viewing the material, but stop short of granting the public a general
right of access to discovery. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has con-
tinued even after the change to Rule 5(d), in 2000, to recognize the public's
right to view discovery. 234 For a court in the Ninth Circuit to issue a protec-
tive order, the party seeking protection must show that "specific prejudice
or harm will result if no protective order is granted," and that the interests
in privacy outweigh the public's interest in access. 235
Regardless of the standards imposed, among both state and federal
courts, the general rule is that once a protective order is issued, it will be
reversed only upon abuse of discretion, giving trial judges wide latitude in
determining whether to grant protection.236
C. Do the Currently Predominant Rules Adequately Balance Interests in
Access?
The increasingly prevalent view that unfiled discovery is strictly pri-
vate no doubt advances the public's interests in the protection of privacy
and the administrative efficiency of the court system. But, as explained
above, it does not sufficiently permit or encourage courts to consider the
countervailing public interests in access. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in the routine issuance of stipulated umbrella protective orders. 237
On the one hand, umbrella orders "expedite production, reduce costs,
and avoid the burden on the court of document-by-document adjudica-
tion."'238 On the other hand, such orders are often the product of an uneven
233. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 357-59 (1 lthCir. 1987) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for treating case as purely private and not weighing public interest in
openness against private interest in secrecy); Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 679 (Wash.
1982) (embarrassment of a party is a sufficient condition for good cause). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of federal courts' varying approaches to "good cause," see Laurie Kratke Dor6, Secrecy By Con-
sent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283,
339-44 (1999).
234. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 659 (Tenn. 1996) ("The burden of establishing
abuse of discretion is on the party seeking to overturn the trial court's ruling on appeal."); McCarthy v.
Barnett Bank of Polk County, 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11 th Cir. 1989).
237. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
("We are unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even a modicum of complexity where an
umbrella protective order ... has not been agreed to by the parties and approved by the court.").
238. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.432 (4th ed. 2004).
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bargain and, as occurred in Frankl, give the parties the ability to control the
litigation without considering the interests of the public. Defendants have
several reasons for seeking umbrella orders: to prevent other potential
plaintiffs from learning about the action; to force other plaintiffs to go
through the discovery process on their own; to prevent the plaintiffs law-
yer from discussing or comparing documents received to those received by
others in similar cases, making it impossible to know whether defendants'
responses to multiple plaintiffs have been inconsistent; and to prevent the
public from learning about possible evidence of wrongdoing. 239 In return,
all that plaintiffs typically get is what they were entitled to under the dis-
covery rules in the first place, but without the threat of protracted litiga-
tion.240 Courts, which might otherwise be inclined to reject such a coercive
deal, sign off on umbrella orders because "the time that it would take a
judicial officer to rule on the protectability of thousands of documents
could cripple the court. ' '2
41
The routine granting of umbrella protective orders, therefore, benefits
defendants and judges at the expense of the public, which is shut out of the
discovery process regardless of the evidence that emerges and in many
instances will be unable to learn anything more about the case because the
parties will settle before trial. A recent article advising defendants on how
to best respond to Fair Labor Standards Act complaints illustrates the per-
versity of the process.242 The authors recommend that companies demand
"broad confidentiality" at the pretrial stage because "experienced plaintiffs'
counsel know that confidentiality and closure is the product they are sell-
ing."'243 The article cautions, however, that if the EEOC or the National
Labor Relations Board gets involved in the case, the agencies "may not
countenance language that amounts, in their view, to gag orders. '244 This,
then, is what the issuance of umbrella orders allows: the buying and selling
of gag orders as a means to avoid public and governmental scrutiny.
239. See Ross T. Turner, Note, Rule 26(c)(7) Protective Orders: Just What Are You Hiding Under
There, Anyway?, 87 KY. L.J. 1299, 1304-05 (1999).
240. See Kurt Putnam, Note, Your Trade Secret Is Safe with Us: How the Revision to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Makes Discovery Presumptively Confidential, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 427,
432 (2002) (arguing that protective order stipulations are often the product of a "devil's bargain," with a
well-funded defendant threatening to challenge a smaller plaintiff's attempt to get discovery "every step
of the way").
241. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986).
242. See Christina Feege & James Boudreau, The Stealth Class Action: Demand Letters Often





Taken together, the currently predominant rules governing public ac-
cess to litigant-centered information-which recognize no right of access to
discovery, allow parties to enter freely into secret settlement agreements,
and give judges broad discretion to issue protective orders-satisfy privacy
interests but fail to balance the public's interests in viewing documents that
expose wrongdoing, in preventing the commoditization of court-generated
information, and in requiring judges to balance public interests before or-
dering secrecy.
D. Alternative Regimes
Several states have experimented with ways to protect the public's in-
terests in access to litigant-centered information without sacrificing privacy
rights or making the legal system too unwieldy or inefficient. Their experi-
ences suggest that the currently predominant regime is not the only or best
means of governing public access to civil litigation. But they also reveal the
fundamental difficulty of attempting to grant access to the types of litigant-
centered information that implicate public interests while simultaneously
protecting the privacy rights attached to materials that do not.
1. Treating Litigant-Centered Information Like Judicial Information
During the deliberations leading to the creation of Rule 76a, the Texas
plaintiffs' bar, along with the state attorney general and lawyers for several
media and public interest organizations, insisted that any new rule would
be "a sham on the public" if it did not apply to at least some forms of un-
filed discovery because so many cases were settled before information was
ever filed with the court. 245 The defense bar and nearly the entire business
community furiously opposed any application to unfiled discovery, assert-
ing that doing so would threaten legitimate privacy interests such as trade
secrets, 246 create a "tremendous increase in the number and length of pre-
245. See, e.g., Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Hearing, Nov. 30, 1989, at 238, 243-49 (testimony
of Tommy Jacks on behalf of the Texas Trial Lawyers Association) (on file with author) (noting the
prevalence of sealing in products liability cases, and that such cases often settle before key information
is filed with the court); Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Proceeding, Feb. 9, 1990, at
256-57 (comments of John E. Collins) (on file with author) ("[1]f you don't include discovery docu-
ments in this definition, it is a sham on the public, the press and the media because, otherwise, all you
have is a plaintiffs original petitions, the defendant's answers and special exceptions. You know, big
deal. That is nothing."); Letter from Jim Mattox, Attorney Gen. of Tex., to Thomas R. Phillips, Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Tex., (Mar. 21, 1990) (on file with author) (arguing that "indiscriminate
sealing" was undermining confidence in the judicial process and threatening the "the health and safety
of our citizens").
246. See Letter from M. Scott Nickson, Vice President, Gen. Counsel, & Sec'y, Dresser Industries,
Inc., to Nathan Hecht, Assoc. Justice, Tex. Supreme Court, Feb. 27, 1990 (on file with author).
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trial hearings, '247 and drive businesses out of the state.248 Interest groups
around the country entered the fray,249 aware that the rule of one state
could have enormous influence on the shape of litigation in other states.250
The Texas Supreme Court, which was bitterly divided on the issue,251
attempted to strike a balance by applying Rule 76a's procedural protections
only to those forms of unfiled discovery that are of special interest to the
public. Accordingly, the rule defines "court records" to include "discovery,
not filed of record, concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect
upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of public
office, or the operation of government. ' 252 This language is narrower than
the court's advisory committee's proposal, which applied broadly to all
matters "concerning" public health and safety regardless of whether there
was a probable adverse effect on either.253 Even so, Rule 76a on its face
appeared to subject a considerable amount of unfiled discovery to the rule's
procedural requirements and to reach the types of cases that first inspired
the legislature to issue its mandate to the court: those involving products
liability, sexual assault, and environmental hazards. Justice Doggett wrote
that the provision was "intended to address those instances where the pub-
lic need is greatest" and that the rule's detractors ignore "the larger role that
courts, no less than the other branches of government, play in contributing
to an informed populace."
254
247. See Herring Memo, supra note 122, at 9.
248. See id. at 35.
249. See, e.g., Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Hearing, Nov. 30, 1989, at 268, 295-96 (testimony
of Tom Smith on behalf of Public Citizens, and Howard Nations on behalf of the American Trial Law-
yers Ass'n) (on file with author); Letter from James E. Walsh III, Vice President Law, Am. Airlines, to
Nathan Hecht, Assoc. Justice, Tex. Supreme Court, Apr. 2, 1990 (on file with author); Letter from
James W. Wilson, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Brown & Root, Inc., to Nathan Hecht, Assoc.
Justice, Tex. Supreme Court, Mar. 21, 1990 (on file with author); Letter from Rose M. Murphy, Assoc.
Counsel, Int'l Paper, to Nathan Hecht, Assoc. Justice, Tex. Supreme Court, Mar. 8, 1990 (on file with
author); Letter from John Hildreth, Dir., Consumers Union, to Nathan Hecht, Assoc. Justice, Tex.
Supreme Court, Mar. 6, 1990 (on file with author).
250. See Richard A. Rosen, Confidentiality Agreements Become Increasingly Elusive, NAT'L L.J.,
July 20, 1998, at B7 ("Because it is virtually impossible to obtain protection for documents that are
already on the public record in one jurisdiction, the state that has adapted the most severe restriction on
entering confidentiality agreements will, as a practical matter, set the standard for courts all over the
country, both state and federal.").
251. The rule passed on a 5-4 vote, and the fight over the its application to unfiled discovery was
so contentious that Justices Raul Gonzales and Nathan Hecht issued an unprecedented public dissent,
arguing that the final rule was "excessive" and that it did not "afford litigants adequate protection of
their legitimate right to privacy." See Concurring and Dissenting Statement By Justice Gonzales and
Justice Hecht, TEx. BAR J., June 1990, at 589.
252. TEx. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
253. See Transcript, Tex. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Feb. 16, 1990, at 175 (com-
ments of Tom H. Davis) (on file with author).
254. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 124, at 654.
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The proffered purpose of the rule, therefore, was to achieve the kind
of balancing of public interests this Article advocates. And an early case
suggested that the rule would work as intended. In March, 1992, General
Motors settled a lawsuit in Fort Worth for an undisclosed sum of money
with the family of Frank Zelenuk, who had died three years earlier when
his GM pickup truck caught fire after a side-impact collision with another
vehicle.255 The focus of the underlying claim was that the placement of the
fuel tanks outside the frame railings of the truck made the tanks more vul-
nerable to explosion in a collision. 256 Under the terms of the settlement
agreement, Zelenuk's family returned to General Motors all documents that
had been exchanged pursuant to a protective order during discovery. 257
Had the case occurred in any state other than Texas, it likely would have
ended there.
Two months after the settlement, however, Public Citizen intervened
pursuant to Rule 76a and asked the court to disclose the discovery docu-
ments to the public. 258 The trial court ruled that Public Citizen first had to
show that the materials-approximately 80,000 documents, including crash
test results, photographs, and memoranda about the fuel system in the
trucks--constituted "court records" pursuant to the terms of Rule 76a.259
General Motors argued that Rule 76a should not apply both because the
protected documents consisted of "highly sensitive engineering and busi-
ness information," 260 and because "none of the information ... concerned
matters that had a probable adverse effect upon the public's health or
safety." 261 Public Citizen, in response, introduced a deposition from a sepa-
rate case in which a General Motors engineer said the company had with-
held from him negative crash test documents that demonstrated the danger
of the trucks, and that if he had seen these results earlier he would have
testified against General Motors.262 The court, based on this testimony,
ruled in favor of Public Citizen, deemed the documents to be "court re-
cords," and scheduled a Rule 76a hearing to see if General Motors could
justify keeping the documents under seal.
263





260. See Mary Hull, 76a Intervention Allowed in Settled Case: GM Claims Protective Order
Shrouds Pickup Crash Data, TEX. LAW., June 15, 1992, at 4.
261. See Laird, supra note 255.




On the morning of the hearing, General Motors decided to release the
documents to the public. 264 They revealed that General Motors had known
as far back as 1974 that its fuel tank design created a greater fire hazard
than other fuel tank configurations, but had not changed the design until
1988.265 (The full extent of General Motors' use of secrecy did not become
apparent, however, until 2003, when a federal judge in Montana ordered
the release of a document that showed the company had confidentially
settled 297 fuel tank cases across the country for a total of more than $495
million.266)
The outcome of Zelenuk led one of the lawyers who represented Pub-
lic Citizen to call Rule 76a "The Public's Crowbar. '267 But the case would
prove to be one of the very few instances, at least through the writing of
this Article, in which Rule 76a has been used to pry open unfiled discovery
materials that expose harms or wrongdoing.
The primary reason for the rule's limited use stems from its one-size-
fits-all approach. If courts were to apply the rule as its language suggests-
to all unfiled discovery "concerning matters that have a probable adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety"-nearly every products
liability case would fall within its ambit. Such a broad scope would result
in applying the rule's cumbersome procedures, as well as its First Amend-
ment-style scrutiny, to thousands of requests for protective orders, even
when the information at issue may not implicate public interests warranting
such protection. Texas appellate courts therefore quickly found a way to
scale back the scope of the rule, forcing litigants to establish independently
that discovery material should be considered a "court record" before being
granted a hearing.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Benson,268 a 1993 case involving alleged defects
in the design of the Ford Bronco II, Ford moved for a protective order be-
fore agreeing to produce documents in discovery. 269 The trial judge sua
sponte decided that she first needed to determine whether the documents in
264. See Laird, supra note 255.
265. Id.
266. See Myron Levin, GM Paid $495 Million in Suits: The Automaker Settled 297 Cases Involving
Fiery Pickup Crashes, a Court Document Shows, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at Al. U.S. District Judge
Donald Molloy ordered the release of the document after finding that good cause did not exist for it to
have been filed under protective order. See id. Judge Molloy had previously ordered the document's
release, Phillips v. GMC, 126 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1329 (D. Mont. 2001), but that decision was vacated by
the Ninth Circuit on the ground that Judge Molloy had not conducted a proper good cause analysis,
Phillips v. GMC, 307 F.3d 1206, 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002).
267. See Laird, supra note 255.
268. 846 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App. 1993).
269. Id. at 488.
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question concerned matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the
general public health or safety. 270 After holding a two-day hearing and
reviewing in camera several thousand pages of documents and deposition
transcripts, the judge found that certain of the materials met Rule 76a's
definition of court records and therefore denied in part Ford's request to
seal. 271 But the court of appeals reversed, holding that when a party moves
for a protective order, the trial court's sole task is to determine whether
"good cause" exists to enter the order.272 According to the ruling, Rule 76a
comes into play only after documents have been exchanged and one party
alleges that they have a probable adverse effect on public safety. 273 The
court also ruled that the burden of proof falls on the party alleging that the
discovery materials constitute court records.
274
The effect of Benson was to give parties an easy way to contract
around Rule 76a's application to unfiled discovery. Shortly after the deci-
sion, two Texas intellectual property lawyers published an article advising
defendants to negotiate protective orders stipulating that none of the docu-
ments produced constitute court records under Rule 76a, because "if neither
party contends that the discovery materials are court records, then the trial
court should not address this issue. '275 As a practical matter, therefore,
Benson made the task of intervening to gain access to unfiled discovery
exceptionally difficult. If the parties stipulate that the documents ex-
changed are not court records-which is likely, considering the cost of
waging a protracted discovery battle-then outsiders would have no access
to the documents they seek to unseal, making it nearly impossible to estab-
lish that the documents have a probable adverse effect on public safety.
In the years since Benson, Rule 76a has been used in only two re-
ported cases to give the public access to unfiled discovery materials. The
lynchpin in both cases was that the parties pushing for access declined to
stipulate to protective orders. In Upjohn Co. v. Freeman,276 the plaintiff,
who alleged that the sleeping pill Halcion caused him to murder his friend,
argued from the outset that the materials requested in discovery were "court
records" under Rule 76a-a strategy that allowed Public Citizen and the
270. See id. at 491.
271. See id.; Janet Elliott, Ford's 76a Loss Sets Stage for Appeal, TEX. LAW., Mar. 23, 1992, at 4.
272. See Benson, 846 S.W.2d at 491.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Jennifer S. Sickler & Michael F. Heim, The Impact of Rule 76a: Trade Secrets Crash and
Burn in Texas, I TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 102 (1993). The Texas court of appeals, in an unpublished
decision, ruled that such stipulated agreements did not violate Rule 76a. Tollack v. Allianz of Am.
Corp., No. 05-91-01943-CV, 1993 WL 321458, at *6 (Tex. App. Aug. 16, 1993).
276. 906 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App. 1995).
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Dallas Morning News to intervene to challenge the defendant's requested
sealing order. 277 The intervention proved to be critical because the plain-
tiffs interest in the case ended in August 1994, after a Texas appeals court
reversed a jury award of $2.15 million, 278 whereas the numerous appeals
surrounding the Rule 76a issues were not resolved until the following July,
when the appellate court upheld the district court order releasing dozens of
documents, including internal company memoranda, adverse reaction re-
ports, and depositions with exhibits from other cases around the country.279
Importantly, however, the court also upheld sealing the documents contain-
ing Upjohn's testing and analysis protocols because they constituted trade
secrets, 280 showing that Rule 76a's balancing test, when applied properly,
has the potential to protect both the public's interest in access and a party's
interest in privacy.
In the second case, Wood v. James R. Moriarity, P.C.,281 it was the de-
fendant who refused to agree to a protective order. James Moriarity, an
attorney, had been sued for libel for running advertisements alleging that a
group of psychiatrists had received kickbacks, overcharged for their ser-
vices, and physically and mentally abused patients. 282 During discovery,
Moriarity requested that the plaintiff psychiatrists produce various personal
and business records. 283 The plaintiffs moved for a protective order, but the
trial court, finding that all of the documents in question constituted "court
records," refused.284 After a public Rule 76a hearing in which the Dallas
Observer intervened, the trial court found that "the public interest and right
to know the contents of Plaintiffs' discovery responses in this lawsuit out-
weigh Plaintiffs' interest in the privacy of such records. '285 The decision
was upheld by the court of appeals in February 1997.286
The following year, however, the Texas Supreme Court released an
opinion that essentially overturned the unfiled discovery provision of Rule
76a. In General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple,287 which, like Benson, involved al-
leged tire defects on the Ford Bronco II, the Court made two key rulings on
277. Id. at 95.
278. Associated Press, New Ruling Favors Maker of Halcion, PHIL. INQUIRER, Aug. 30, 1994, at
A14.
279. Upjohn, 906 S.W.2d at 98.
280. Id. at 94-95.
281. 940 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. 1997).
282. Id. at 360.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 362.
285. Id. at 364.
286. Id. at 365.
287. 970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998).
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the application of Rule 76a to unfiled discovery. The first was that the
rule's notice and hearing provisions are not to be applied to the threshold
determination of whether unfiled discovery constitutes court records. 288 As
a result, the only way for a third party to gain access to unfiled discovery is
to hope that the trial judge is willing to inspect the documents in camera
and make an independent ruling on the matter. 289 The second holding was
that a trial court cannot broadly rely on an alleged product defect in deter-
mining that discovery materials "concerning" that alleged defect constitute
court records.290 Rather, trial courts must find a specific "nexus" between
the alleged defect and the documents at issue.291 Applying this standard,
the Texas Supreme Court found that none of the documents that had been
exchanged in discovery in the case-including tire design specifications
and information relating to how frequently customers returned defective
tires-had a sufficient nexus to the specific defect at issue to be considered
court records. 292 It is difficult to imagine how a third party, unable to in-
spect discovery documents, could ever learn enough about them to be able
to meet such a rigorous threshold.293 After General Tire, no reported cases
have applied Rule 76(a) to unfiled discovery.
294
The Texas experience thus demonstrates how the desire of litigants
and courts to retain the status quo can render meaningless a rule that is
sweeping in its potential scope but imprecise as to how it should be ap-
plied. At a hearing of the Texas Supreme Court's advisory committee in
2004, Charles Babcock, a defense lawyer who represents media and insur-
ance companies, described how even if unfiled discovery arguably falls
within the definition of a court record under Rule 76a, "the parties will
agree to a protective order, give it to the judge to sign, and then wait to see
if a member of the press or a member of the public comes in and complains
about it."295 Tracy Christopher, a trial judge, responded that this was a
positive development because if courts had to scrutinize all stipulated pro-
tective orders that might implicate Rule 76a, they would have to do so "in
288. Id. at 524.
289. Id. at 525.
290. Id. at 527.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Tom Smith, the director of the Texas office of Public Citizen, said the General Tire decision
"eviscerates Rule 76a." See Janet Elliott & Nathan Koppel, Key Supreme Court Rulings Tackle Seat
Belts and Spoliation, TEX. LAW., June 15, 1998, at 4.
294. Based on a search of LexisNexis and Westlaw.
295. Transcript, Supreme Court Advisory Comm. Hearing, Mar. 4, 2004, at 11266 (comments of
Charles Babcock) (on file with author).
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every products case."'296 This would impose "a huge burden on the trial
[c]ourt to look through every single document that is produced to determine
whether or not it impacts the health, safety and welfare. '297
The Texas rule, therefore, has not created an administrative burden
and has not, by most accounts, led to unwarranted invasions of litigant
privacy. But other than in a handful of cases, the rule does not appear to
have had its intended effect of requiring courts to consider the public's in-
terest in accessing discovery materials in those instances in which that in-
terest is particularly strong.
2. "Banning" Protective Orders in Public Hazard Cases
Whereas Texas has tried to protect the public's interest in access to
litigant-centered information through procedural means and the establish-
ment of a rigorous balancing test, Florida has attempted to reach the same
end by prohibiting courts from entering protective orders in cases of public
importance. Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act, which was enacted in
1990, provides that "no court shall enter an order or judgment" that con-
ceals a "public hazard. ' 298 The law is a categorical ban that neither allows
for the kind of balancing test required by Texas's Rule 76a nor has an es-
cape clause like the District of South Carolina's Local Rule 5.03. The Sun-
shine Act's only explicit exception-for trade secrets "which are not
pertinent to public hazards" 299-- excludes nothing in practice since relation
to a public hazard is what triggers the law's application in the first place.
Thus, under the terms of the statute, even if the "information concerning a
public hazard" is a valuable trade secret or implicates important privacy
concerns, it cannot be concealed.
The law also defines "public hazard" in expansive terms: the phrase
refers to "an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, in-
strument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instru-
ment, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause
injury."300 By including people, products, and procedures in the list, the
statute appears to address secrecy in the types of cases that most concern
296. Id. at 11271 (comments of Tracy E. Christopher) (on file with author).
297. Id.
298. FLA. STAT. § 69.081(3) (2005) ("Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order
or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concern-
ing a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of
concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves
from injury which may result from the public hazard.").
299. Id. § 69.081(5) ("Trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not pertinent to public
hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688.").
300. Id. § 69.081(2)
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the public: sexual abuse, products liability, environmental contamination,
and medical malpractice. The definition is limited in a crucial way, how-
ever: for an "instrumentality" to be a public hazard, it must have caused
injury in the past and be likely to do so again in the future. This require-
ment creates considerable ambiguities and gives litigants a potential way of
getting around the law. Is a priest who molested a child, for example, a
"public hazard" if it cannot be proven that he is likely to offend again?
What about a doctor who has made the same medical mistake several
times? The statute also suffers from one of the key problems that weakened
the effect of Texas Rule 76a: it is not clear at what point a court is to make
the determination of whether something constitutes a public hazard. Should
it be before the exchange of discovery? After trial? At the moment of set-
tlement?
The statute has another provision that is narrower in scope than ap-
pears at first glance. On its face, the Sunshine Act grants standing to "[a]ny
substantially affected person, including but not limited to representatives of
news media," to contest any order or agreement that violates the statute. 301
But unlike Rule 76a, the law does not spell out a procedure for interven-
tion, nor does it provide a mechanism for giving third parties notice of any
sealing orders. It also does not provide trial courts with continuing jurisdic-
tion over protective or sealing orders.
As a result of these ambiguities and omissions, in practice the Sun-
shine Act, like Rule 76a, has had far less impact than its supporters had
imagined, largely failing in its purpose of preventing courts from entering
protective orders that conceal public hazards. 302 Interviews with several
Florida trial and media lawyers, 303 and an examination of the limited exist-
ing case law on the Act, reveal two predominant reasons the law is utilized
so infrequently.
First, because the definition of "public hazard" requires the "instru-
mentality" at issue to have caused and be likely to cause injury, it is rarely
clear or obvious whether a protective order conceals what is in fact a public
301. Id. § 69.081(6).
302. E.g., Telephone Interview with Barry Richard, Attorney, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., (Feb. 16,
2005) (plaintiffs' Attorney who advocated for the passage of the Act); see also infra notes 306-30 and
accompanying text.
303. See Telephone Interview with Barry Richard, supra note 302; Telephone Interview with
Barbara Peterson, President, Fla. First Amendment Found. (Feb. 12, 2005); Telephone Interview with
Pete Weitzel, Former Director, Fla. Freedom of Info. Movement (Feb. 18, 2005); Telephone Interview
with Sandy Chance, Dir., Brechner Ctr. for Freedom of Info. at the Univ. of Fla. (Feb. 10, 2005); Tele-
phone Interview with Bruce R. Kaster, Attorney, Bruce R. Kaster, P.A., (Feb. 23, 2005) (attorney for
Ronnie Jones); Telephone Interview with Rebecca Womeldorf, Member, Sedona Conference (Feb. 18,
2005).
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hazard. As a result, courts are reluctant to rule that something is a public
hazard until after either trial on the merits or a separate Sunshine Act hear-
ing, which can resemble a trial. Because protective orders are issued at the
outset of litigation, before any such hearing, judges can continue to issue
them without violating the law-even in products liability cases-under the
theory that the determination of whether the product is a public hazard has
not yet been made.
The law, therefore, has tended to come into play only in the rare cases
in which it is clear that a public hazard exists. In ACandS, Inc. v. Askew, 304
the first reported case in which the Sunshine Act was raised, the appeals
court affirmed the trial court's order granting access to deposition testi-
mony because the case involved asbestos, and "the public is well aware of
the dangerous nature of asbestos. '30 5 Likewise, during the course of dis-
covery in the state's high-profile lawsuit against the American Tobacco
Company and other cigarette manufacturers to recoup Medicaid costs, 306
the fact that the health hazards of cigarettes had been acknowledged by the
manufacturers themselves enabled the special master in charge of oversee-
ing discovery to declare sua sponte that the Sunshine Act prevented him
from issuing the kind of umbrella protective order that the tobacco compa-
nies had won in nearly every other state. 307 Similarly, in September 2000, a
Miami judge relied on the Act to dissolve a protective order in a case in-
volving Firestone ATX tires two months after the company issued a na-
tionwide recall of that model tire. 308
But when the existence of a public hazard has yet to be established,
the task of applying the Sunshine Act becomes exceedingly difficult. In E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert,309 a case involving allegations that
the pesticide Benlate had ruined the plaintiffs ornamental plant business,
the Florida Secretary of Agriculture and a local newspaper intervened to lift
an order granting the parties confidentiality during the discovery proc-
ess.310 The intervenors argued that Benlate, which allegedly caused wide-
304. 597 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
305. Id. at 899.
306. See State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH, 1996 WL 788371 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
1996).
307. See Judy Plunkett Evans, Tobacco Companies Lose Bid to Keep Documents Sealed, PALM
BEACH DAILY Bus. REv., Oct. 4, 1996, at BI.
308. See Drew Douglas, Product Liability: Florida Judge Lifts Order Shielding Firestone Docu-
ments in Rollover Lawsuit, 191 DAILY REP. EXEC., Oct. 2, 2000, at A-27 (citing Alvarez v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., No. 98-21672 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2000) (bench ruling)).




spread crop damage in Florida,311 was a public hazard under the terms of
the Sunshine Act.312 DuPont responded that "[t]he statute does not create
an open search through a manufacturer's files merely because a product is
alleged.., to be a public hazard. ' 313 The trial court scheduled a hearing on
the issue, but before the hearing took place, a jury returned a $3.15 million
verdict in the underlying lawsuit. 314 The judge subsequently cancelled the
Sunshine Act hearing and, based on the evidence introduced at trial, ruled
that Benlate was a public hazard and lifted the confidentiality order. 315 The
decision was reversed on appeal, however, on the ground that procedural
due process requires a court to hold a separate Sunshine Act hearing before
releasing documents pursuant to the statute. 316 (On remand, the trial court
scheduled a full evidentiary hearing, but before it took place, DuPont vol-
untarily released the documents. 317)
The appellate court's due process ruling in DuPont served to patch a
significant procedural hole in the statute, but also made it much more costly
and time-consuming for courts to apply the Sunshine Act. This became
evident in Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Carnoto,318 a case that began
in 1995 and has yet to be resolved. During discovery in Novartis, which
involved allegations that the anti-lactation drug Parlodel caused the plain-
tiff to have a stroke, 319 Judge Robert Andrews decided to do something
Florida judges rarely do: acting sua sponte, he refused to issue a blanket
protective order until after determining whether the Sunshine Act ap-
plied.320 Because the case involved hundreds of thousands of documents,
311. See Paul Power Jr., Sunshine-in-Litigation Act Ineffective in Benlate Dispute, TAMPA TRIB.,
Dec. 19, 1995, at 18.
312. DuPont, 654 So. 2d at 227-28.
313. Power, supra note 311 (alteration in original).
314. Id.
315. DuPont, 654 So. 2dat 227-28.
316. Id. at 228.
317. See Jermain Griffin, Legislators to Negotiate Scope of Proposed 'Sunshine in Litigation' Law,
Cm. DAILY L. BULL., May 9,2003, at 1.
318. Case No. 95-9076 09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.); Telephone Interview with Wilton L. Stickland,
Attorney, Wilton L. Strickland, P.A. (Jan. 20, 2006) (Attorney for Plaintiffs Connie and Rene Carnoto).
319. See Fla. Trial Court Can Hold 'Public Hazard' Hearing Before Drug Case Concludes,
MEALEY'S EMERG. DRUGS & DEVICES, Aug. 2,2001, at I [hereinafter Public Hazard].
320. See Stephen Van Drake, Drug Maker Attacks State's Public Hazard Law, So. FLA. BUS. J.,
Aug. 10-16, 2001, at IA (noting that Judge Andrews demanded the Sunshine Act hearing on his own,
as none of the litigants in the case asked for one). An alternative view about whether judges should
question the propriety of issuing protective orders in products liability cases was expressed by Miami
Judge Eleanor Schockett, who said in a 2000 interview that she regularly gives protective orders at the
outset of litigation because "nothing has been proven yet" and because protective orders are an impor-
tant check on overly aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys. See Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts' Cloak of
Secrecy Be Deadly?: Judicial Orders Protecting Companies Kept Tire Case Quiet, USA TODAY, Oct.
16, 2000, at lB.
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however, Judge Andrews assigned a special master to review the docu-
ments and make a recommendation as to the applicability of the statute.321
Novartis appealed, arguing that it had never consented to the referral
of the matter to a special master and that any ruling on the Sunshine Act
issue would be akin to a judicial determination of the merits of the case.
322
Novartis contended that Sunshine Act hearings should only occur after
trial, or else parties "could be saddled with the 'public hazard' label even if
the jury subsequently finds [them] blameless. ' 323 The issue attracted the
attention of national interest groups, with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the Products Liability Advisory Council, and The TRUE Coalition (Tort
Reform United Effort), filing amicus briefs on behalf of Novartis, and the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers filing on behalf of the plaintiffs.324 The
court of appeals found the challenges to the constitutionality of the Sun-
shine Act to be "premature at best," but ruled that Novartis had not con-
sented to the referral to the special master, so Judge Andrews would have
to address the issue on his own.325
The decision kept alive the prospect of the Sunshine Act being used
by judges before trial to refuse to enter broad protective orders that might
conceal public hazards. But it also highlighted the difficulty of such a proc-
ess. After the appeals court decision, Judge Andrews told a newspaper that
he had "better things to do than spend hours upon hours upon hours to re-
view documents. '326 And Novartis continued to fight to keep its documents
from being disclosed, petitioning the appeals court on five separate occa-
sions to have Judge Andrews removed from the case. 327 Judges thus have
little motivation to rely on the Sunshine Act to reject motions for protective
orders. For example, in a recent case involving whether the drug Accutane
caused a young man to fly a plane into a building, a magistrate-finding it
"unnecessary" to resolve the plaintiffs' claims that the Sunshine Act pre-
321. See Van Drake, supra note 320.
322. See Public Hazard, supra note 319.
323. See id.
324. See id
325. See Novertis Pbarm. Corp. v. Carnoto, 798 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
326. See Van Drake, supra note 320.
327. See Kelly Cramer, Justices: Judge Deserves Reprimand, MtAMI DAILY BUS. REV., May 14,
2004, at 1. In June 2003, the fifth attempt to remove Judge Andrews succeeded. A year earlier, the
judge had been quoted in a 2002 article saying that Novartis was "trying to bury the plaintiffs in docu-
ments" and that the company had "only itself to blame" for the escalating costs of the litigation. After a
rebuke by the appeals court, Judge Andrews agreed to remove himself from the case. Id. See also
Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Carnoto, 840 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("We are confident
that if this experienced trial judge finds the motion legally sufficient, he will disqualify himself without
further intervention of this court.").
[Vol 81:375
SEALING AND REVEALING
cluded the issuance of a confidentiality order-approved an order making
all material produced in the case presumed to be confidential.
328
The second reason for the limited use of the law is that parties have
little incentive to litigate Sunshine Act issues on their own and the law does
not provide for the kind of notice that would regularly attract intervenors.
In the recent case of Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,329 for example,
the Sunshine Act came into play only because there was little cost to the
plaintiff in raising the issue. 330 The facts of the case are as follows. In Oc-
tober 1994, Ronnie Jones, a thirty-five-year-old auto mechanic in Miami,
was severely injured when a school bus's tire that he was trying to fix sud-
denly exploded. 331 Jones sued Goodyear, the maker of the tire, claiming
that a design defect caused the explosion. 332 Before the trial, Goodyear
convinced the court to grant a confidentiality order-over Jones's objec-
tion-that prohibited the parties or their lawyers from disclosing to the
public any Goodyear documents obtained during discovery, 333 some of
which allegedly show that Goodyear's own tests of the tire model that in-
jured Jones revealed the tire's propensity to burst under pressure. 334 In
2001, when a jury awarded Jones $1.8 million in damages, the confidential-
ity order remained in place, and Jones intended to comply with its terms
and return all documents to Goodyear. 335
But the trial court then issued a directed verdict and ordered a new
trial based on lack of evidence. 336 Jones appealed to have the verdict rein-
stated, and because he was already before the appeals court, he also moved
to have the confidentiality order vacated based on the Sunshine Act. 337 The
court of appeals in 2003 reinstated the verdict and held that "[s]ince the
jury clearly found that Jones was injured by the tire in question, the tire is
deemed a 'public hazard,"' and therefore no court could enter an order
328. See Accutane Plaintiff Attorney Can Share with Co-Counsel; No Public Hazard Hearing,
MEALEY'S EMERG. DRUGS & DEVICES, Apr. 17, 2003, at 11.
329. 871 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
330. See Telephone Interview with Bruce R. Kaster, supra note 303.
331. Goodyear, 871 So. 2d at 900.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 905. Jones raised the Sunshine Act in protesting Goodyear's request for the blanket
confidentiality order. Id. But once the judge issued the order, Jones could not raise the issue on appeal
until after the trial because under Florida law, the issuance of protective orders cannot serve as the basis
for interlocutory review. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3); Kyker v. Lopez, 718 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
334. Telephone Interview with Bruce R. Kaster, supra note 303.
335. Id.
336. See Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899, 901-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
337. See id. at 905; Telephone Interview with Bruce R. Kaster, supra note 303.
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"which would conceal information regarding this tire. '338 The appeals
court ruling, while protecting the public's interest in access to information,
reveals the problem of the categorical nature of the Florida statute. Once
the court found that the tire was a public hazard, no information "concern-
ing" the tire could be sealed. This opened the door to the release of poten-
tial trade secret information that the public arguably had an interest in
keeping confidential.
The outcome of Goodyear has breathed a little life into the Sunshine
Act, with some plaintiffs' lawyers saying they will rely on it to challenge
protective orders more frequently. 339 But in most cases, the cost and delay
that can be generated by litigation over the Act mean that it takes especially
motivated plaintiffs, such as those in the Accutane case, or a high-profile
case that attracts intervenors, such as the one involving Benlate, or judges
willing to take matters into their own hands, such as Judge Andrews, for
the law to be applied.
3. Restricting Secret Settlements
The provisions of Texas Rule 76a and the Florida Sunshine Act dis-
cussed above attempt to protect the public's interest in litigant-centered
information by limiting the discretion of judges to enter secrecy orders. The
Texas rule and the Florida statute, as well as laws in Washington and Lou-
isiana, also attempt to achieve the same objective by limiting the ability of
parties to reach settlement agreements that conceal public hazards.
Texas Rule 76a defines "court records" to include not just some forms
of unfiled discovery, but also unfiled settlement agreements "that seek to
restrict disclosure of information concerning matters that have a probable
adverse effect upon the general public health or safety. '340 In theory, this
provision should apply to cases like Frankl, in which the parties agreed to a
settlement that restricted disclosure of information concerning the safety of
the Goodyear tire. But no reported cases in Texas exist showing that this
provision of Rule 76a has ever been used. One possible explanation is that
the rule has no enforcement mechanism. So long as the parties agree that
the product at issue does not have a "probable adverse effect" upon public
safety, no third party is likely to ever learn enough about an unfiled settle-
ment to be able to prove its danger to the public. Even in Frankl, the parties
could easily have agreed that the "probable adverse effect" of the tire had
338. Goodyear, 871 So. 2d at 906.
339. Telephone Interview with Barry Richard, supra note 302.
340. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(b).
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yet to be established, and CARS, without access to the underlying docu-
ments, would never be able to show otherwise.
Similar enforcement difficulties plague other states' attempts to re-
strict secret settlements. The legislative history of Florida's Sunshine Act
suggests that the law's primary purpose was to stop parties from entering
into settlements that concealed the dangers of hazardous products.34 1 Ac-
cordingly, section (4) of the law renders void and unenforceable "[a]ny
portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of con-
cealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any
information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting
themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard. '342 As
with Texas Rule 76a, however, no reported cases exist in which a settle-
ment was rendered invalid under the law 343-and a past president of the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers reports that the law has had no impact
whatsoever on parties' willingness to secretly settle products liability
cases. 344 One reason for this may be the way the Sunshine Act defines
"public hazard." Parties who enter into secrecy agreements potentially cov-
ered by the law can argue that no court has yet established that the "instru-
mentality" at issue has ever caused or is likely to cause harm. Moreover, no
incentive exists for a party to breach a secret settlement once entered be-
cause there would be no guarantee that a court would find that the law ap-
plied; such a breach would therefore place the settlement payment at risk.
The Washington and Louisiana laws also appear to have had little, if
any, impact on parties' willingness to enter into secret settlement agree-
ments. Both states attempt to strike more of a balance than do the Texas
and Florida rules by stressing the public's interest not only in access but
also in protecting valid privacy interests.
Washington's Public Right to Know Bill, enacted in 1994, applies
only in products liability and hazardous waste cases. 345 It provides that
courts can enter or enforce confidentiality agreements only if the agreement
341. See H.R. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SB 278, FINAL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT
2 (Fla. 1990) (citing the "growing concern relating to the practice of settling cases, especially in the
products liability area, where as a part of the settlement the parties will agree not to disclose informa-
tion regarding hazardous products, or the court will enter a protective order precluding such disclo-
sure").
342. FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2005).
343. Search of Westlaw, LexisNexis, and www.flcourts.org.
344. Telephone Interview with Lance J. Block, Jr., Past President, Acad. of Fla. Trial Lawyers (Jan.
13, 2006).
345. WASH. REV. CODE.§ 4.24.611 (2005).
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is "in the public interest. '346 The law's preamble defines the "public inter-
est" in two ways. First, it highlights the importance of public access:
The legislature finds that public health and safety is promoted when the
public has knowledge that enables members of the public to make in-
formed choices about risks to their health and safety. Therefore, the leg-
islature declares as a matter of public policy that the public has a right to
information necessary to protect members of the public from harm
caused by alleged hazards to the public. 347
Second, it stresses the need to protect privacy:
The legislature also recognizes that protection of trade secrets, other con-
fidential research, development, or commercial information concerning
products or business methods promotes business activity and prevents
unfair competition. Therefore, the legislature declares it a matter of pub-
lic policy that the confidentiality of such information be protected and its
unnecessary disclosure be prevented.348
Accordingly, the law requires courts, before approving or enforcing a
confidentiality agreement, to weigh the public safety risks of secrecy
against the "right of the public to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion. '349 This kind of balancing test might have had real impact if courts
were required to apply it when evaluating whether to issue protective or-
ders. The law on its face also has a more comprehensive reach than the
Florida law in that it is not limited to hazards that have actually caused
injury.350 Rather, the statute applies to confidentiality agreements that limit
the disclosure of information "about an alleged hazard to the public,"
thereby applying to potentially all products liability cases. 351
The law, however, does not apply to protective orders,352 and instead
covers only agreements between parties, including "private" agreements, 353
which courts rarely see. As a result, the law's reach is exceptionally nar-
row: it applies only when courts are required to approve a settlement
agreement in a products liability or hazardous substance case, or when one
party in such a case breaches a settlement and the other calls on the court to
enforce it. The only reported case citing the law found that it did not apply
346. Id. § 4.24.611(4)(b).
347. Id. § 4.24.601.
348. Id.
349. Id. § 4.24.61 l(4)(b).
350. Id. § 4.24.611(1)(b).
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id. § 4.24.61 1(4)(a) ("Nothing in this chapter shall limit the issuance of any protective or
discovery orders during the course of litigation pursuant to court rules.").
353. Id. § 4.24.61 l(1)(b) ("'Confidentiality provision' means any terms in a court order or a private
agreement settling, concluding, or terminating a product liability/hazardous substance claim, that limit
the possession, disclosure, or dissemination of information about an alleged hazard to the public,
whether those terms are integrated in the order or private agreement or written separately.").
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to a confidential settlement in which the defendant agreed not to harass a
psychologist.3
54
Like the Washington law, Louisiana's anti-secrecy statute, referred to
at the time of its passage as the Sunshine in the Courthouse bill, tries to
strike a balance between the public's interest in openness and its interest in
keeping certain forms of information confidential. The statute's provision
"banning" secret settlements states:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect
of concealing a public hazard, any information relating to a public haz-
ard, or any information which may be useful to members of the public in
protecting themselves from injury that might result from a public hazard
is null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy,
unless such information is a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information.
355
The statute also gives "any representative of the news media" standing to
contest any violation of the law. 3
56
The Sunshine in the Courthouse bill was passed amid much hype, with
its sponsor, Representative Glenn Ansardi, declaring that it would "render
null and unenforceable any portion of an agreement which would attempt
to conceal a public hazard. '357 But once the law was enacted in 1995, it
seemed to disappear: from that year until this writing, the law has not been
mentioned in any of the state's major newspapers or legal newsletters 358
and has not once come up in any reported case law.359 One likely explana-
tion for this is the law's broad exception for "commercial information," a
term the statute doesn't define,360 but which gives litigants a ready argu-
ment for why the law should not apply. Moreover, the right to intervene
means little if public representatives have no way of knowing when or
whether parties agree to a secret settlement.
4. Targeted Bans of Private Secrecy
One of the reasons Texas, Florida, Washington, and Louisiana have
appeared to be unable to curb parties' willingness or ability to enter into
private secrecy agreements is that the states' rules are unclear regarding to
whom or what they apply. The rules all attempt to restrict or prohibit set-
tlements that conceal information concerning "public hazards," but parties
354. State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 863, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
355. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (2005) (emphasis added).
356. Id. art. 1426(E).
357. See CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE COMM., MINUTES 9, Apr. 25, 1995 (Louisiana).
358. Search of LexisNexis database of Louisiana newspapers and legal resources.
359. Search of Westlaw and LexisNexis.
360. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426.
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can always argue that no court has yet determined that the product at issue
is a public hazard. As a result, lawyers and clients who agree to secrecy-
and potentially earn a premium for their silence-have little incentive to
breach their contracts and risk their settlement awards on the possibility
that a court will find that the existence of a "public hazard" excuses the
breach.
One possible solution to this contracting-around-the-law problem is
for states to give up attempting to ban harmful secret settlements with a
single broadly worded statute and instead enact specific laws that leave no
doubt whatsoever that confidentiality clauses in certain well-defined sets of
cases are prohibited and will not be enforced. For example, the one provi-
sion of Florida's Sunshine Act that has this kind of clarity-and that law-
yers say is working as intended361-is the law's 1991 amendment banning
confidentiality clauses in settlements in all cases against the state or against
any municipality. 362 Several states have similar provisions prohibiting state
agencies from secretly settling their cases. 363
Another anti-secrecy provision with clearly defined parameters is New
Jersey's 2003 law requiring information about any medical malpractice
award, whether reached through judgment or private settlement, to become
part of each practitioner's profile that is posted on the intemet.364 The law's
unambiguous application should make it difficult for parties to contract
around. 365 This means, however, that no balancing of interests takes place:
the malpractice information will be posted regardless of the existence of
any countervailing interests. Such targeted bans of secrecy therefore may
have greater potential than rules with broader scopes-and correspondingly
larger loopholes-to reveal societally useful information, but must be nar-
rowly confined so as not to jeopardize legitimate privacy interests.
361. Telephone Interview with Bruce R. Kaster, supra note 303; Telephone Interview with Barbara
Peterson, supra note 303; Telephone Interview with Sandy Chance, supra note 303; Telephone Inter-
view with Pete Weitzel, supra note 303.
362. FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (8)(a) (2005).
363. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing
Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 760, 777-78, 78 n.61 (noting examples of states that ban secret
settlements with state agencies and recommending that all states and cities ban secret settlements in
civil actions against the police).
364. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.22(a), 23(a)(10) (West 2004); New Jersey Office of the Attor-
ney General, New Jersey Health Care Profile, http://12.150.185.184/dca/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
365. The law has not been in effect long enough to be able to measure compliance because its
enforcement was put on hold until last year, when a federal court ruled that the statute was constitu-




Public access to information generated through litigation enables citi-
zens to monitor and participate in the judicial system and have confidence
that courts serve public, as well as private, interests. Public access also
enables courts to reveal information useful to a society that relies to a great
extent on private parties to enforce its laws. The current regime of rules
governing access to court-generated information, however, has not only led
court processes to occur increasingly in private, but also has enabled
wrongdoers to manipulate the system and hide their bad acts, and allowed
judges to put the state's enforcement power behind morally questionable
contracts of silence.
While several states and courts have tried to reverse the trend toward
privacy in litigation, no set of rules yet exists that has achieved the proper
balance among the public's interests in accessing information about judicial
decision-making and litigant wrongdoing, protecting privacy rights, and
ensuring the attractiveness of the courts as a venue for dispute resolution.
Several key lessons, however, can be drawn from this Article's review of
the rules governing public access to court-generated information.
First, the currently predominant rules do not adequately protect the
public's interest in either judicial or litigant-centered information. Both sets
of rules leave too much potential for the parties in a case to agree among
themselves to secrecy and then have a judge sign off on their request. The
FJC study of sealed settlements, the willingness of Connecticut courts to
seal files without providing justification, and the experiences of Texas and
Florida with sunshine rules that look strong on paper but that have often
been ignored all demonstrate that simply having rigorous standards is not
enough to protect the public's interests in access to court proceedings. If
given broad discretion and no mandatory procedure to follow, judges face
too much pressure from litigants and from their dockets to be expected to
say "No" to requests for secrecy.
Second, at least when it comes to judicial information, the most effec-
tive means of ensuring that the public's interests are given sufficient weight
appears to be to give third parties a meaningful opportunity to intervene
before courts order records to be sealed and also to require judges who
issue sealing orders to make particularized findings of fact that the privacy
interests outweigh public interests in access. As Justice Powell explained,
"If the constitutional right of the press and public to access is to have sub-
stance, representatives of these groups must be given an opportunity to be
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heard on the question of their exclusion. '366 In today's world of wired
courts and litigants, the minor costs involved in establishing a procedure
whereby all requests to seal records are posted on a court's website a day or
more in advance of a sealing hearing are far outweighed by the need to
ensure the protection of the public's access rights.
Third, it is not enough to fix the rules governing judicial information
and leave alone the ability of parties to exchange-and then burn-
discovery in secret. Yet, whereas Texas Rule 76a provides a laudable
model for the rules governing judicial information, no such model exists
for litigant-centered information. The state sunshine experiments, while
acting to some extent as "information-forcers," 367 (revealing information
about General Motors, Halcion, Firestone, the American Tobacco Com-
pany, and more) have largely failed to prevent parties and courts from se-
cretizing the kinds of litigant-centered information that implicate public
interests.
The state experiences do, however, point in the direction of what a
model regime would look like. It would begin with the presumption that the
public has at least a qualified right of access to some forms of litigant-
centered information. The sheer scope of material that is exchanged in dis-
covery, combined with the public interest in not giving courts incentives to
pull back on liberal discovery, caution against providing a sweeping right
of access equal to the right of access to judicial information. But a qualified
right of access could avoid these pitfalls while allowing third party interve-
nors to represent the public in those cases in which public access interests
are strongest. A model regime would provide a mechanism that efficiently
sorts out the information exchanged in discovery that implicates no public
concerns from the information that the public has an interest in seeing-
e.g., information that implicates the merits of the case or reveals evidence
of harms or wrongdoing.
One possible starting point is the Massachusetts rule in the Geoghan
case that permits "concerned citizens" to intervene to gain access to dis-
covery. That rule alone, however, would have little effect without alerting
representatives of the public that a protective or sealing order exists. Per-
haps parties should be required to publicly post their discovery requests in
order to provide notice to potential intervenors of the categories of docu-
ments to which they may seek to gain access. An alternative would be to
require that once parties enter court and use judicial power to gain discov-
ery, they cannot leave court without a special master reviewing the docu-
366. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
367. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 653-54 (2005).
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ments exchanged as well as any settlement agreement to see if public inter-
est material is being hidden. Lawyers' groups also can create their own
norms in this regard and adopt the ethics rule proposed by Richard Zitrin
that would prohibit lawyers from participating in agreements that conceal
public dangers. 368 Ideally, states would experiment with different regimes
to see which rules most effectively balance the public interests at stake.
What is clear, however, is that the status quo, in which more and more of
the judicial system operates behind closed doors, should not be seen as the
best or only plausible alternative.
368. See Zitrin, supra note 164, at 904-05.
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